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"ART FOR A BETTER LIFE:"* A NEW IMAGE OF AMERICAN 
LEGAL EDUCATION 
Kara Abramson** 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a first day of law school that begins not with a casebook, not 
with a rule, not with the Socratic method, but with an 
Image 
Sound 
Poem 
Story 
History 
Picture a contracts class that starts not with Hurley v. Eddingfieti or 
Hawkins v. McGei but with a deeper look at the ideas underpinning the 
notion of contract beyond its American incarnation. Visualize, then, 
liberating contract law from the pages of an American textbook and 
exploring its origins and its essence across time and space. Push the 
Uniform Commercial Code aside for a moment and visit contract in 
ancient Rome, understand how it operated in medieval Japan, hear its 
haunting legacy in the voices of coalminers whose songs of struggle 
detail the failure of contract to protect workers, and revisit contract today 
to probe the issues of consent and free will that have shaped recent 
debates over trafficking in human beings. Meet the idea of contract as a 
'Art jiH· u Better Life is the title of a traveling art exhibit by artist Urs Luthi. E.g. Rafael Newman, 
Urs Luthi. Artji;r u Better Lij'e, http://www.dumag.ch/bisher.php?id= 15l&summary=yes (accessed 
Feb. 25, 2006). 
" A.B. Princeton University, 1998: J.D. Harvard Law School, 2003. The author thanks Dean 
William Alford, Harvard Law School, for his guidance. 
I. 59 N .E. I 058 (Ind. 190 I). 
2. 146A.641 (1929). 
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rich, complex story, of which the American version is but one chapter. 
American legal education shuns this vision. American law students 
learn American law. They are taught to look inward to a narrow telling of 
law as a body of rules gleaned from the appellate decisions of American 
courts. Poetry and song, history and literature-none has a place in this 
classroom. Here, the images and sounds that rule are the dull pages of 
overstuffed casebooks, obsessively organized study aids and student 
outlines, and the menacing tone of a professor's Socratic questioning. 
To be sure, the preceding portrayal of American legal education is 
extreme, but one that is not wholly unwarranted. Created at the hands of 
Christopher Columbus Langdell, the stodgy American tradition of legal 
training myopically focused on case law and Socratic questioning has 
endured to the present day even as the legal world has come to reject 
Langdell's philosophy of law as a science. Langdell's legacy lives, even 
if it has been softened, and it is especially strong in the first, most 
formative year of American legal education. 
Critiques of Langdell's formalism, from the realism of the interwar 
period to the critical legal studies movement of more recent decades, 
have chipped away at the power of Langdell's vision of law and legal 
education. New philosophies of law are taught alongside or instead of 
black letter rules and legal doctrine extracted from appellate cases. 
Professors today tum to lectures, interdisciplinary scholarship, and role-
playing exercises to supplement or even replace Langdell 's Socratic 
questioning and case-centered teaching materials. Some alternatives to 
Langdell's method, however, such as the law and economics approach, 
do little to alleviate the narrow scope of legal teaching methods; other 
approaches, such as the law and literature movement, present a powerful 
reevaluation of law, yet tend to be marginalized within law school 
curricula. Unfortunately, in the first-year law school class, the 
Langdellian mindset persists. 
This Article is an attempt to present an alternative to the standard 
Langdellian method of legal teaching. It presents an alternative to 
standard legal education and an effort to systematize existing challenges 
to it by suggesting a comprehensive curriculum for first-year law school 
classes. At the core of this challenge to Langdell 's heritage is a vision of 
legal education that looks outward to the larger world of knowledge that 
gives life to law. It is a vision of law in three forms: a liberal art, an 
American enterprise, and a practical profession. 
The first Part of this Article gives a brief overview of American legal 
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education. It outlines the history of American law schools and the current 
contours of law school curricula. The remainder of this Article is a 
proposal for change, envisioned as a first-year law school class that 
presents law through three lenses. More specifically, this Article 
imagines a first-year course divided into three parts, lasting roughly four 
to five weeks each, which introduce three distinct angles of a first-year 
legal subject. Part II of this Article describes the first unit of such a law 
school class: law presented through the medium of liberal learning. This 
unit stresses the roles of history and the arts in conveying law's story. It 
also encourages a more global view of law by probing the dimensions of 
a legal subject in different cultural settings. 
Part Ill maps out the middle portion of class: an introduction to a 
legal subject through a series of lectures and conversations about the 
subject in its American context. This Part's articulation of legal 
education moves beyond the current standard paradigm by advocating 
greater attention to United States law outside of appellate decisions and 
Socratic questioning. It also urges constant reference back to the larger, 
more global story of law taught in the first weeks of class. 
The final Part of the Article details the final weeks of class: an 
initiation, primarily via cooperative and collaborative learning 
simulations, into legal practice skills that relate to the specific legal 
subject studied in class. It not only aims to overcome the marginalization 
of practice-based education within law schools but also strives to 
demonstrate to students the link between theory and practice. 
Cumulatively, the three portraits of law conveyed in this Article present a 
new image of American legal education. 
I. DEFINING THE CONTEXT: AN OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN LEGAL 
EDUCATION 
A. Langdell's Vision: The Roots ofAmerican Legal Education 
Our lead education story begins, as always, with Christopher 
Columbus Langdell. Lang dell's arrival at Harvard Law School in 1870 
introduced new order to a century of American legal education 
characterized by diverse approaches to learning law. On the one hand, 
scholar-statesmen such as Thomas Jefferson espoused a rigorous 
approach to legal learning that included the study of history and poetry,3 
a model worthy of emulation today but oft ignored even in Jefferson's 
own time. In a similar vein, David Hoffman, in 1817, outlined a multi-
3. Robert A. Ferguson, l"aw and Letters in American Culture 28 (Harv. U. Press 1984). 
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year course of study for law students that included an examination of 
subjects such as philosophy and Roman law alongside contemporary 
American legal subjects.4 In contrast, Abraham Lincoln joined the legal 
profession after only cursory study of the law. 5 Other lawyers similarly 
crammed for the bar via study aids.6 Still others, such as John Quincy 
Adams, entered the legal profession after an unsatisfying period of 
apprenticeship in a law office. 7 By 1860, standards for entering the bar 
had deteriorated as the number of states that mandated a formal course of 
study to pass the bar declined.8 Such laxness of standards threatened the 
very raison d'etre of American law schools.9 
The legal community was ready for a revolution in legal education, 
and Langdell emerged to lead it. The poor New Hampshire farm boy 
who rose to prominence by his own gumption was a legend at the 
Harvard Law School even during his stint there as a student. 10 Known 
then for long days at the library and tremendous self-discipline, 11 
Langdell returned to Harvard as a faculty member and quickly imposed 
similar rigor on the next generation of law students. 12 Langdell was not 
the very first professor to teach with case-centered materials, 13 but he 
was the driving force behind refining and popularizing the method, 
which spread across the United States in the following decades. 
At the core of Langdell's method was the uncovering of a body of 
law through close study of selected legal decisions. Not all legal 
decisions were fair game in his pedagogic vision, however. Instead, he 
selected only a few designed to reveal a body of doctrine or illustrate 
mistaken deviations from the rules. 14 The need to censor irrelevant cases 
led to the creation of textbooks that narrowed the body of law to be 
studied. 15 Langdell further focused the subject of instruction by 
4. !d. at 29; David Hoffman, A Course ol LeKal Studv Addressed to 5'tudents and the 
Profession Cienerallv 53-57 (Morton J. Horowitz & Stanley N. Katz eds., rcpr. ed., Arno Press 
1972) 
5. Ferguson, supra n. 3, at 29. 
6. !d.; see Joel Seligman, The High Citade/26-27 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1978). 
7. Ferguson, supra n. 3, at 29-30: Seligman, supra n. 6, at 21-22. 
8. Seligman, supra n. 6, at 26-27. 
9. See id. (describing the decline of required legal training and requirements for entering 
legal study). 
10. /d.at29-31. 
II. !d. at 30-31. 
12. ld at 32-34. 
13. Robert Stevens, Law School. Legal Education in America.fi-rJm the !?!50s to the /9?/0s 52 
(G. Edward White ed., U. of N.C. Press 1983). 
14. See id. at 52-53 (stating that the original purpose of the case method was to isolate and 
analyLe the relatively few principles of the common law). 
15. Seligman, supra n. 6, at 45; Steven, supra n. 13, at 53-56. 
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explaining the legal topic at hand not by lecture but through what has 
come to be called the Socratic method: a process of questioning loosely 
designed on the dialogues of its namesake. 16 As a means of interrogating 
students on the specifics of each case, the Socratic method was intended 
to avoid mindless absorption of facts and cultivate critical thinking skills 
within students. No answer was definite in the Socratic framework; 
students learned to probe the various dimensions of a case until they had 
unearthed a legal rule or larger principle and were able to link it to other 
principles to form a concrete body of law. 17 
Underpinning this pedagogy was Langdell's view of law as a 
freestanding science. 18 Just as the laboratory was the incubator for 
students of science, Langdell was known to say, so was the library the 
proper environment for law students. 19 Neither the classical learning of 
Jefferson nor the apprentice office of Adams was appropriate under 
Lang dell's model of legal education. 20 The study of law at the law-
school level thus had to shun the study of related disciplines and the 
cultivation of practical skills. Law stood alone. It was not an empty box 
that absorbed other disciplines. To Langdell, law represented a discrete 
science in its own righ\ composed of fully discernable legal principles 
that had their own force. 1 
Students clamored for knowledge of law as clearly enunciated rules, 
cut off from an examination of the social context in which the rules 
operated;22 this could have meshed well with Langdell's faith in the 
identification of law as a discrete entity that did not depend on 
knowledge of broader social issues, but he drew great enmity from 
students for his delivery?3 Langdell's earliest students declared outrage 
at their professor's convoluted teaching method?4 Fortunately for 
Langdell and Harvard Law School, the voices of dissatisfaction faded, 
and within a few years Harvard began an upward swing in enrollment.25 
Lang dell's method was but one step in a series of reforms introduced 
to Harvard Law School. By the 1895-96 academic year, only college 
graduates and a select group of advanced Harvard undergraduates 
16. Seligman, supra n. 6, at 33-35; Stevens, supra n. 13, at 53. 
17. Seligman, supra n. 6, at 35-36, 45. 
18. !d. at 36. 
19. Stevens, supra n. 13, at 53. 
20. See Seligman, supra n. 6, at 33-34. 
21. Stevens, supra n. 13, at 52-55. 
22. See Seligman, supra n. 6, at 34. 
23. !d. at 33-35. 
24. !d. at 34-35. 
25. !d. at 35. 
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qualified to enter the school.26 Four years later, Harvard increased the 
required length of its course of study from two years to three?7 Outside 
of Harvard, other law faculties began to adopt Langdell 's method as a 
springboard to greater prestige.28 State schools in particular, such as the 
University of Cincinnati, which turned to the method in 1895, found the 
cachet of Langdell's method useful, and in the 1920s, his pedagogy 
spread to state schools in the South. 29 
Not all law schools embraced the Langdellian method. Some local 
law schools continued to gear their instruction to passing the state bar,30 
and other law schools, like Columbia and the University of Virginia( 
voiced concern over the Langdellian method as it gained prominence. 3 
Critics did not necessarily reject Langdell's method wholesale. Alfred 
Reed, a Carnegie Foundation staff member who studied professional 
education, noted, '" 1 believe that while in the hands of a genuine scholar, 
skilled in the Socratic method, the case method is indubitably the best, in 
the hands of a mediocre man it is the very worst of all possible modes of 
instruction."'32 Despite such critiques, Langdell's vision of legal 
education firmly took root across the nation. By 1908, about a third of 
U.S. law schools used Langdell's method, and it continued to s~read 
quickly, becoming the prevailing norm in American legal education. 3 
B. Early Critiques: Realist Challenges to the Langdellian Method 
The reevaluation of law that emerged in the 1920s, known as 
realism, represented the first well-organized challenge to the Langdellian 
status quo in American legal education. Premised on the notion that law 
was necessarily linked to the social context that produced it, realism 
rejected Langdell's notion of law as a distinct science. Realists aimed to 
understand how law related to the societies upon which it acted.34 To this 
group, law was more than a body of rules. 35 It was necessarily bound to 
26. !d. at 41. 
27. !d. at 33. 
28. !d. at 42-44. 
29. Stevens, supra n. 13, at 61, 191. 
30. !d. at 192. 
31. !d. at 60, 192. 
32. !d. at 121 (quoting Alfred Z. Reed, TraininJ; ji>r the l'uhlic Proji!.1sion of the Law: 
Historical Development and PrinCLj){l/ Contemporary !'rob/ems ofl"eJ;al t;ducation in the United 
States with Some Account of Conditions in long/and and Canada 3X2 (Charles Scribner's Sons 
1921 )). 
33. Seligman, supra n. 6, at 42-45 (stating that about a third of law schools had adopted the 
method by 1908); Stevens, supra n. 13, at 64 (indicating that about a third of law schools had 
adopted the method by 1907). 
34. Seligman, supra n. 6, at 50. 
35. !d. at 50-52. 
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the forces of society and the lives of ordinary people;36 it was, to some 
realists, a social science in its own right. 37 Putting their theories into 
action, realists made strong contributions to New Deal policies and, in 
academic circles, waged war against Langdell?8 
One realist saw the standard Lan~dellian legal education as divorced 
from the realities of legal practice. "American legal education went 
badly wrong some seventy years ago when it was seduced by a brilliant 
r~urotic," Jerome Frank, a leading figure in the realist movement, 
proclaimed in a 1947 article.40 Attention to appellate cases, he claimed, 
produced a distorted vision of the legal process,41 and failure to observe 
the practices of courtrooms and lawyers cut law students off from the 
realities of their profession. 42 Frank advocated scrapping Langdell' s law 
school for a clinical approach to legal education that introduced students 
within the classroom to a wider array of legal issues and brought them 
beyond the classroom into close contact with their future profession.43 
Fellow realist Karl Llewellyn pushed for new entrance requirements 
to law school, calling for schools to populate their ranks with students 
who were well versed in subjects like psychology and United States 
history and who were marked by "intellectual eagemess."44 Like Frank, 
Llewellyn urged law schools to pay more attention to the social context 
in which law operated.45 Indeed, to Llewellyn, such social context was 
necessary because "[t]he fact is that legal rules mean, of themselves, next 
to nothing."46 Moreover, the social facts made for better pedago~ 
because they made the rules "more meaningful" and "easier to learn." 
Llewellyn organized teaching materials that reflected this outlook.48 His 
Cases and Materials on Sales, published in 1930, lived up to its name by 
supplementing legal decisions with other sources that informed the 
49 law. 
Students, meanwhile, waged their own battles. Electives and 
36. /d. 
37. !d. at 50. 
3R. /d. at 53. 
39. Jermone Frank. A Plea jill" rawyer Schools. 56 Yale L.J. 1303, 1306, 1310 ( 1947). 
40. !d. at 1306. 
41. !d. 
42. !d. at 1306, 1310. 
43. !d. at passim. 
44. Karl Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal J,·ducation, 35 Co1um. L. Rev. 
651,660 (1935). 
45. !d. at 668-72. 
46. !d. at 669. 
47. !d. at 669 (emphasis removed). 
4R. Seligman, supra n. 6, at 51. 
49. !d. 
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seminars were being integrated into the curriculum, 50 but students 
demanded even more change. Harvard students rallied against large class 
sizes, 51 a feature of the Langdellian method that made it less expensive 
than small classes and seminars, 52 and urged the administration to 
confine the case method primarily to first-year classes. 53 The public 
service mentality of the realists also gripped law students. In the 1920s 
only a handful of schools had legal aid clinics, 54 but by the 1940s, such 
55 programs had become more common. Slowly but surely, both students 
and legal scholars mounted a challenge to the pedagogic tradition 
launched by Langdell. 
C. Post-Realist Critiques and the Current State of American Legal 
Education 
"The undiluted Langdell principles are nowhere in good repute 
today," Jerome Frank wrote in 1947. "But they are still the basic 
ingredients of legal pedagogy, so that, whatever else is mixed with them, 
the dominant flavor is still Langdellian."56 
The latter half of the twentieth century witnessed further 
encroachments on the Langdellian method. American legal education 
now presents a complex mix of pedagogies. Yet in many ways Frank's 
assessment of legal pedagogy rings true even today. "The case method's 
dominant position in U.S. law schools is a curious phenomenon," wrote 
Russell Weaver in 1991. "It has been achieved despite the fact that 
Langdell's justification for developing and using the method ... has long 
since been repudiated. The case method's dominance has also been 
achieved notwithstanding much criticism, which continues even 
today."57 
Despite the persistence of the Langdellian method, the changes to the 
legal education landscape in the past half-century have not been 
insignificant. In the 1950s and 1960s, law schools introduced new 
pedagogies that operated alongside the Langdellian method, such as the 
problem method, introductory legal· courses, and clinical classes. 58 By 
50. Stevens, supra n. 13, at 158. 
51. See Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale /927 1960 62 (G. Edward White ed., U. of 
N.C. Press 1986 ). 
52. Stevens, supra n. 13, at 63. 
53. !d. at 161. 
54. /d. at 162-63. 
55. /d. at 215. 
56. Frank, supra n. 39, at 1312. 
57. Russell L. Weaver, Langdel/'s Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 Viii. L. Rev. 517, 
545--46 ( 1991 ). 
58. Stevens, supra n. 13, at 212-·13. 
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the 1966-67 academic year, Harvard offered more than a hundred 
electives, 59 but these courses represented more of an ornament atop the 
dominant Langdellian cast of legal education rather than a replacement to 
it. 6° Campus upheavals and growing tBoliticization among student bodies 
contributed to the push for reform. 1 Some changes were successful. 
Clinical legal education programs had blossomed by the 1970s, even as 
clinical instructors were often poorly regarded by traditional law school 
faculty. 62 Other changes were fleeting. Harvard's "Development of Legal 
Institutions" class, designed to give students historical context to various 
legal subjects, was discontinued in 1968 as a required class.63 By the 
1970s such back~round classes were the exception rather than the rule at 
top law schools. 4 At Northeastern University Law School, which had 
roots as a local night school, the curriculum in 1971 was organized 
around a social justice theme. Although Northeastern continues to stand 
out among law schools for its innovative cooperative learning program, 
. . h d~ Its progressive tones ave wane . 
Several new schools of legal thought developed in the latter decades 
of the twentieth century. The critical legal studies movement, has offered 
a new critique of law that aimed to expose its underlying biases and its 
vulnerability to prevailing power dynamics. Another school of thought. 
the law and economics approach, has examined legal decisions through 
the lens of economic analysis. Funneled through this heuristic, law-
related choices are seen to reflect economically efficient or inefficient 
options. On the other end of the interdisciplinary legal studies spectrum, 
the law and literature movement has introduced works of literature and 
techniques of literary analysis into legal studies with aims such as the use 
of literature to illustrate law's force on society and the promotion of 
more nuanced interpretations of legal texts. Against this background of 
new theories and teaching methodologies that coexist with a still firmly 
rooted Langdellian method, observers of contemporary legal education 
offer conflicting portraits of the method's status in contemporary law 
schools. Some scholars see a demise of the Langdellian method. Richard 
Posner, for example, laments what he observes as a decline in the "most 
valuable technique of legal teaching."66 Posner's viewpoint may reflect 
59. Seligman, supra n. 6, at 81. 
60. !d. at 81 82. 
61. See e.g. id. at 6-7. 
62. Stevens, supra n. 13, at 241. 
63. Seligman, supra n. 6, at 84. 
64. See id. at 84, 141 (discussing the few schools offering first-year electives) 
65. Robert Granfield, Makin!{ Elite Lawvcrs: Visions of'l.aw at flarl'ard and Bevond, 68-197 
(Routledge 1992 ). 
66. Richard A. Posner, l.e!{al Scholarship Today, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1647, 164 7 ( 1993 ). 
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his political leanings more than the reality of legal education. He 
perceives a decline in the method because, to his mind, policies like 
affirmative action erode rigorous academic standards.67 
Orin Kerr offers empirical evidence to back up claims that the 
Langdellian method is being phased out of American legal education, but 
he ultimately fails to make a strong case for his argument. 68 Based on a 
1997 survey of twelve Harvard Law School professors who taught first-
year courses,69 he categorized only five as "traditionalists" who adhered 
firmly to the Socratic method70 and, one can assume, to the case method 
that combines with Socratic questioning to form the Langdellian method. 
He categorized three professors in his sample as "quasi-traditionalists" 
who combined the Socratic method with other teaching styles.71 Finally, 
four members of his sample comprised the "counter-traditionalists" who 
"have consciously rejected the traditional Socratic style."72 These 
counter-traditionalists used techniques ranging from a panel system for 
calling on students to a philosophical introduction to a legal subject 
coupled with practical skills training.73 Based on the range of teaching 
methods used by his sample, Kerr concluded that the "traditional 
Socratic method . . . is no longer common at Harvard~and, assuming 
Harvard is typical, at most American law schools."74 
Kerr's in-depth description of the teaching styles of the twelve 
professors is a useful contribution to scholarship on legal education, but 
his conclusions about the nature of American legal education are 
unconvincing in several respects. First, Kerr fails to expressly define the 
term "Socratic method" in his article. Today, the term is used both 
narrowly, to refer to a process of questioning within the classroom, and 
broadly, as a synonym for the Langdellian method. The Socratic method 
as a questioning process may be used independently, but it is often paired 
with case materials within the legal classroom. Kerr seems to refer 
mainly to the narrow meaning of the Socratic method, but closer 
attention to how the case method and Socratic method relate, especially 
in the classrooms of the twelve professors he interviewed, would have 
eliminated confusion and deepened the scope of Kerr's analysis. 
Second, the fact that eight out of twelve of the sample~the 
traditionalists and the quasi-traditionalists~used the Socratic method 
67. !d. 
68. Orin S. Kerr. The Decline of the Socratic Method at Harvard. 78 Neb. L. Rev. 113 ( 1999). 
69. !d. at 115. 
70. !d. at 122. 
71. !d. at 123. 
72. !d at 124. 
73. !d. at 124-25. 
74. !d. at 132. 
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(and, most likely, the Langdellian method) in some form in their 
classrooms suggests that the method is in fact still prominent. Even some 
of the professors in Kerr's counter-traditionalist category appear to have 
used the Socratic method. The so-called "panel system" of identifying in 
advance the students who will be called on in class, is often just a 
modified version of instruction that still centers on teacher-led 
. . d b k . I 75 questwnmg an case- oo matena s. 
In light of these flaws, Kerr's assertion that the Socratic method is on 
the wane at Harvard76 is doubtful, at best. His assumption that trends at 
Harvard must be indicative of the situation elsewhere is even more 
troubling.77 While Harvard developed the dominant mode of legal 
education used at American law schools, the spread of the Langdellian 
pedagogy to other schools was not instantaneous.78 Even assuming that 
the Socratic method and other related Langdellian apparatuses are indeed 
in danger of becoming extinct at Harvard-a problematic assertion in 
and of itself-Kerr offers no evidence to prove that new trends at 
Harvard today produce an immediate trickle-over (or, as Harvard might 
prefer, a "trickle-down") effect on other schools. 
Steven Friedland provides a broader survey of the current state of 
American legal education.79 Like Kerr, he focuses on the "Socratic 
method" rather than the "Langdellian method" in his survey,80 and 
because he allows each respondent to attach his or her own meaning to 
the term,81 the survey likely captures more of its divergent definitions. 
Taken as a general gauge, Friedland's survey provides good insight into 
the ways various elements of the Langdellian method-either 
Langdellian-style Socratic questioning techniques alone or 
comprehensive Langdellian tools of questioning aligned to case 
material-are used in legal education today. 
After receiving 574 responses from a national pool of 2000 law 
professors whom he contacted in the 1994-95 school year,82 Friedland 
found that 370 of 383 professors of first-year classes used the Socratic 
method.83 Thirty percent of the teachers used it "most of the time." 
Forty-one percent employed the method "often." Twenty-one percent 
75. !d at 125. 
76. !d. at 132. 
77. !d. 
78. Seligman, supra n. 6, at 42-43. 
79. Steven I. Friedland, How We Teach: A Survey of" Teaching Techniques in American Law 
Schools, 20 Seattle U. L. Rev. I (1996). 
80. !d. at I. 
81. ld at 15. 
82. !d. at 14. 
83. !d. at 28. 
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utilized it "sometimes," and five percent used it "rarely."84 
His survey also revealed a range of alternative teaching techniques. 
Seventeen percent of the first year teachers used small groups for an 
average of four percent of their class time, 85 and thirty percent used role 
playing, averaging five percent of the total cumulative class time. 86 
Based on his overall results, Friedland concluded that "the Socratic 
approach remains firmly entrenched in legal education."87 
Another scholar, Russell Weaver, using the term "case method" to 
refer to Langdell's pedagogy,88 suggests that the method has survived in 
part because the law students who were successful under the Langdellian 
method are inclined to teach it as professors. 89 He argues that the 
Langdellian method "is unquestionabl~ the primary method of 
instruction in United States law schools." 0 Weaver's conclusion about 
the "case method" is supported by the results of the surveys of Friedland 
and Kerr, even though Kerr felt that the Socratic method was on the 
decline. 91 Although the Langdellian method is no longer alone on law 
school campuses, it is still a dominant method of legal education. 
Books and test centers that prepare students for entering law school 
also serve as a mirror of trends in legal education. Such study guides 
reiterate not the study habits useful in undergraduate education but those 
uniquely tailored to the Langdellian method. "Going to law school?" 
asks the title of one prep book. 92 "What may come as a surprise is that 
the very nature of the teaching at law school is different from what you 
are used to," the authors explain.93 "Law professors generally use the 
'Socratic method' (or, in less grandiose terminology, the 'case method') 
of teaching, and this will require some adjustment in how you approach 
your classes."94 Market demand for advice on navigating the Langdellian 
84. !d. 
85. !d. at 27. 
86. !d. 
87. !d. at 28. 
88. Weaver, supra n. 57, at 543-44. ("Students examine primary source materials, whether 
statutes or cases, and they are expected to reach their own conclusions about how problems should 
be resolved. The professor's function is to stimulate thought in a Socratic fashion."). 
89. !d. at 544. 
90. !d. at 543. 
91. Friedland, supra n. 79, at 28; Kerr, supra n. 68, at 132; Weaver, supra n. 57, at 543. 
92. Harry Castleman & Christopher Niewochncr, Going to Law School~: Everything You 
Need to Know to Choose and Pursue a Degree in l.aw (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1997). 
93. !d. at 19. 
94. !d.; BarBri Nile, a law school and bar preparation company, describes its law school prep 
course and refers to the Socratic method. Bar/Bri, Program Overview-Workshops, http://www 
.lawschoolprep.com/program/workshops.shtm. The BarBri Nile program explains that it prepares 
students for the first year of law school by teaching them "[h]ow to play the Socratic game (and 
win')" and "[h]ow to briefcases." !d. 
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method adds yet another layer of support for the possible immortality of 
Lang dell's legacy. 
II. IMAGING LAW 
Training law students through a curriculum centered on the appellate 
decisions of American courts is an incomplete pedagogy and one 
uprooted from context. It is like teaching an aspiring homebuilder about 
building four walls and a roof, while denying him or her instruction in 
the nature of homebuilding materials or the relationship between a 
structure and its surroundings.95 A law school course that aims to 
reattach a legal concept to the world in which the concept developed 
must deviate from the standard approach to American education. 
Unlike their medical school counterparts, American law school 
students need not complete a common "pre-law" course of study before 
entering law school. The lack of a pre-law canon for American law 
students is not a shortcoming of the system in itself. Pre-law courses 
consisting of wholly vocational dimensions may crowd out precious 
undergraduate time that could otherwise be devoted to broad liberal 
learning. The fact that undergraduate education is often separated from 
professional training is in fact a strong point of the American educational 
system. American students have more time to develop broad intellectual 
capacities in general undergraduate coursework and refine that 
development via "majors" or "concentrations" than many of their non-
American counterparts who must squeeze liberal and professional 
training into an undergraduate education. 
It is unclear, however, if law schools truly place faith in the value of 
undergraduate training as a requisite for studying law, as law school 
admissions brochures might profess, or, more cynically, if law schools 
simply don't care what students study as undergraduates because none of 
it matters in the legal classroom. In accepting students from a multitude 
of undergraduate experiences, from liberal arts training to pre-
professional education in marketing or accounting, law schools recognize 
that students may enter law school without any knowledge of law or with 
only limited knowledge of legal subjects. Yet many law schools take few 
measures to rectify this gap in knowledge. The danger of legal academia 
95. Douglas A. Henderson, Uncivil Procedure: Ranking Law Students among Their Peers, 27 
U. Mich. J.L. Reform 399, 399 (1994) (citing Christopher T. Matthews, Student Author, SketchesfiJr 
a New l,aw School, 40 Hastings L.J. 1095, 1099 (1989)). To continue this analogy, law school might 
also be like teaching a student about homebuilding without giving him or her the actual chance to 
pound nails into wood. See Part IV, later in this paper, for a more detailed discussion about the gaps 
between law school instruction and practice skills. Along these lines, Matthews likens law school to 
"requiring house painters to study art history-never picking up a brush." !d. at 399. 
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is not in the admission of students with limited or no knowledge of law. 
Rather, the danger is that law schools may not provide students with a 
complete picture of law, including law's origins, development, 
philosophical underpinnings, and its interactions with and effects on 
society. Legal context courses that aim to introduce students to general 
ideas about law are either relics of the past96 or relegated to the status of 
supplementary courses outside of standard first-year core subjects. 
However, the concepts embodied in first-year subjects don't stand alone, 
despite formalist portrayals of legal subjects as fully independent 
entities. 97 Some of the larger, more general issues about legal theory 
would be well suited to an independent course, but they should be 
equally at home in standard first-year classes. 
A first-year course that aims to open students' understanding of law 
rather than funnel it through the narrow fetters of standard legal 
education might devote the initial third of the course to the introduction 
of law as a story larger than the pages of American textbooks. This 
vision encompasses the idea of a legal subject as a collection of 
narratives about the subject's roots, incubation, evolution, form in 
diverse times and places, development as part of concrete "legal 
systems," effects on modem-day society, and role in the international 
arena, to name but a few of the angles through which a particular legal 
concept might be examined. The heuristic underpinning this vision of 
legal pedagogy is that of presenting law through liberal learning. 
A. Liberal Legal Education 
The idea of "liberal learning" or "liberal arts" is subject to divergent 
meanings. In the American context, the identity of liberal learning was 
the subject of dispute in the early twentieth century between 
restorationists, who called for adherence to the classical learning 
associated with European and early American higher education, and 
pragmatists, who advocated hi~her learning suited to the specific context 
of the American experience. 8 Today, scholars continue to debate 
whether liberal learning must center on a canon of subjects and texts or 
whether it should reflect a more fluid inclusion of subjects; institutes of 
higher learning reflect a diversity of styles.99 
96. See Seligman, supra n. 6, at 84 (detailing a course entitled Development of Legal 
Institutions that ceased in 1968 to be a required course and "ended the only serious attempt of 
Harvard Law School in the post-World War II period to revive the theoretical framework of its 
curriculum"). 
97. !d. at 45. 
98. Robert Orrill, Editor's Prologue, in Education and Democracy: Re-inwgining Liheral 
Learning in America xiii, xvi- xvii (Robert Orrill ed., College Bd. 1997). 
99. Sec e.g id. at xx-xxi. 
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Broadly conceived, however, liberal learning might be commonly 
understood as combining elements of '"breadth,' a sampling from the 
main branches of structured knowledge, and 'depth,' the major." 100 In 
the arena of legal education, liberal learning involves exposure to law 
through the disciplines that inform it. Legal liberal learning is broad. It 
includes sciences, social sciences, and humanities, but still maintains 
depth by anchoring this learning in a particular first-year legal subject. 
Legal subjects intersect with other disciplines in different contexts. 
In many cases, the link between liberal disciplines and the law is 
obvious: the natural sciences shed light on the development of rules of 
evidence and proof in criminal proceedings; statistics influence standards 
in tort law; sociology exposes the factors that shape the workings of our 
criminal justice system; and economic theory articulates the market 
forces that bear on legal institutions. The humanities are, to some 
observers, less obviously connected to the law, but in fact they are a 
crucial component of liberal legal learning. Despite the development of 
"law and literature" as a legal discipline, the humanities remain a 
controversial addition to legal academia. As this Part discusses, however, 
the humanities, especially the arts, are essential to conveying law's story. 
Indeed, the art of historical narrative provides the ideal entry into an 
understanding of law that is linked to liberal learning. 
Of the many ways to tell law's story, history is the ideal discipline in 
which to root law. As historian Paul Gagnon explains, "History is the 
basic, generative humanities discipline, u~on which the coherence and 
usefulness of other disciplines depend." 01 Or, as Diane Ravitch, a 
specialist in history and education, explains, "[history] establishes a 
context of human life in a particular time and place, relating art, 
literature, philosophy, law, architecture, language, government, 
economics, and social life." It "encourages . . . a sense of 
perspective." 102 Of course, the history of a legal subject is not a simple 
narrative that describes the development of contract law in America, or 
even the evolution of contract law from ancient Rome to modem-day 
society. Law's story includes these histories, but it is more complex. It 
involves attention to a legal subject's identity in non-western regions, 
embraces the pre-history of a legal subject, and gives attention to the 
human emotions that have shaped the development of the subject. It is a 
story told as a historical narrative that cradles other disciplines such as 
100. Charles W. Anderson, Pragmatism, Idealism, and the Aims of' Liberal Education, in 
Education and Democracy: Re-imagining Liberal Learning in America, supra n. 98, at 113. 
101. Paul Gagnon, The Humanities and Democracy in America, in Challenges to the 
Humanities 23, 30-·31 (Charles E. Finn, Jr. et al. eds., Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc. 1985). 
I 02. Diane Ravitch, From History to Social Studies: Dilemmas and Problems, in Challenges to 
the Humanities, supra n. I 0 I, at 94. 
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philosophy, social science, natural science, and the arts. 
B. Outlining a Liberal Course (if"Study 
There are many ways to provide historical context to the study of 
law. For example, a teacher of criminal law or torts might begin a course 
with an examination of the ideas of revenge and retribution that preceded 
the development of formal legal doctrines designed to channel these 
urges. Students might look to the idea of "custom" as distinct from "law" 
to understand what factors coalesced to create a body of ideas that we 
now recognize as "property law" or "contracts." After examining the 
early roots of a legal subject, the narrative might continue to probe the 
character of the discipline through an examination of how the subject 
was realized in diverse historical settings. As roots of many modern-day 
legal systems, the legal orders of ancient and pre-modern Europe are 
helpful lenses through which to examine a legal subject, but legal inquiry 
must not be limited to European historical roots. An examination of how 
different Amerindian nations viewed their relationship to land provides 
students with an additional tool for understanding the idea of property 
and provides a useful framework for understanding the modern-day 
indigenous rights movement. In addition, a study of the diverse 
geopolitics of central Africa provides insight into notions of custom and 
law as they relate to land and state power. Islamic and Jewish marriage 
contracts, often works of art in addition to mere legal documents, 
illustrate legal concepts in religious systems. 
Moving to recent centuries, students might look to how 
developments in science have changed criminal investigations. They 
might study the nineteenth century Chinese case of Hsiao-pai-ts 'ai for an 
example of how a careless mistake in an autopsy led to a leijal debacle 
that has attained legendary status in Chinese popular culture. 1 3 Criminal 
students might also turn to comparative works of history and sociology 
to analyze how age or socioeconomic status affects crime rates. 
As students progress in their historical narrative to the present day, 
they could turn to the field of international law. Given that many 
international law principles draw on concepts from the civil law world, a 
prior introduction to civil-law concepts throughout this unit would prove 
to be especially useful here. 104 Turning to current issues in international 
law, property students might examine how concepts in property law 
extend to notions such as national sovereignty or self-determination. 
103. For an account of this event, sec William P. Alford, 0/Arsenic and Old Laws. Looking 
Anew at the Criminal Justice Process in Late Imperial China, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 1180 ( 1984). 
104. See Luz Estella Nagle. Maximizing Legal Education: The International Component. 29 
Stetson L. Rev. 1091, 1092-93 (2000). 
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Contracts students might study contract in the context of international 
treaties. Civil procedure students could look at the rich history of 
jurisdictional disputes within international law. 
Finally, throughout this journey, students might study larger issues 
common to all legal subjects, such as general differences in 
contemporary families of legal systems, issues of bias in the law, the role 
of law in nation building, the bridge between customary and formal law, 
and the idea of separation of powers to clearly demarcate the role of the 
judiciary. 
This venture detailed above is a different enterprise from the 
standard method of teaching law through casebook materials and 
Socratic questioning, 105 and the unique nature of this liberal arts 
introduction demands a different pedagogic approach. Since the venture 
is a close cousin to the liberal learning in American undergraduate 
institutes, a similar methodology-in-class lecture supplemented by 
primary and secondary-source materials-is in order. The historical 
narrative demands that a good portion of class time be devoted to 
fleshing out law's story through lecture. The instructor might also draw 
on student participation by promoting in-class discussion during or after 
lectures, or by devoting one class a week solely to class discussion. 106 As 
discussed in greater detail later within this section, lectures also could be 
supplemented in-class via artistic materials, such as songs and works of 
art. 
This overarching tour aims to provide students with a firm 
background in the various ideas relating to a legal subject. Students will 
be better prepared to critically examine the specifics of the subject in its 
American form if they understand the subject in a larger historical 
framework, which is illuminated by other fields such as the sciences, 
social sciences and philosophy. Yet an introduction to a legal subject 
through these disciplines alone fails to portray the full force of law's 
story, and the dominance of one discipline in portraying a legal subject 
may result in the closing, rather than opening, of law's story. For 
example, the law and economics movement has contributed important 
insight into the way legal institutions operate, yet when it becomes the 
overriding lens through which to view law, it distorts the way law 
operates as it essentializes legal activities into strictly economic 
interactions. The tendency, especially in the social sciences, to reduce 
law to a set of experiences that conform to set theories runs the risk of 
shutting out the range of law's experiences. As a body of knowledge and 
experiences that can add further context to the social sciences and other 
105. These traditional methodologies are discussed in detail in Part 111. 
106. The role of lecturing in the classroom is drawn out in greater detail in Part Ill. 
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portrayals of the law, the arts greatly enrich an understanding of law. The 
arts play a pivotal role in ensuring that liberal legal learning thoroughly 
portrays the many faces of law. Like other subjects, the arts should not 
serve as the sole lens through which to channel a historical narrative of a 
legal subject. However, because the arts are often marginalized within 
legal academia, they deserve special mention here. 
C. Arts in Legal Academia and Arts in the Legal Classroom 
Outside the realm of art law or First Amendment issues, legal 
academia's relationship with art has been most closely linked to the art of 
words. 107 The law and literature movement, often traced back to James 
Boyd White's 1973 book The Legal Imagination, 108 has explored the 
multiple points of contact between law and non-legal written texts. As 
Bruce Rockwood notes, "law and literature" includes a wide variety of 
techniques under the umbrella of its name, ranging from the analyses of 
depictions of law within literature to the borrowing of literary tools of 
. . . d d I I 109 mterpretatwn m or er to rea ega texts. 
The dominant mode of humanistic discourse in the interdisciplinary 
domain of "law and" subjects, law and literature centers its scope of 
inquiry to texts. The goals of the law and literature movement, from 
portraying law in action to contributing to a greater understanding of 
legal texts, are more fully realized through utilization of several art forms 
in addition to literature. Legal scholarship on other art forms has not 
achieved the broadly recognized "movement" status of law and literature 
scholarship, but has contributed further techniques for understanding 
how law relates to artistic enterprises. 
The following sections elaborate on the character of the law and 
literature field and articulate a larger space for the arts to function within 
the first-year legal classroom. Art, broadly conceived, may be classified 
into the collection of categories listed below. Each category describes a 
specific point of contact between art and law and a specific way in which 
107. However, as a field within legal academia, law and literature docs not seem to have had a 
large influence in the first-year classroom. Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette's 1993 survey of American 
law schools, for example, found that law and I iterature subjects were typically introduced through 
small, upper-level seminars. Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette, Law and Literature: Joining the Class 
Action, 29 Val. U. L. Rev. 665,675 (1995). 
108. Marijane Camilleri, Student Author, Lessons in Law ji-om Literature: A Look at the 
Movement and a Peer at Her Jwy, 39 Cath. U. L. Rev. 557, 557 n. I ( 1990); James Boyd White, The 
Legal Imagination (abr. ed., U. of Chi. Press 1985). Strains of a "law and literature" consciousness 
are evident in earlier works. See Llewellyn, supra n. 44, at 663--64 (arguing that there is a "need. 
in some fashion, for an integration of the human and the artistic within the legal," and advocating 
that students might gain a fresh perspective on legal issues by looking at works of art). 
109. Bruce L. Rockwood, Introduction: On Doing Law and Literature, in Law and Literature 
Perspectives 5-7 (Bruce L. Rockwood ed., Peter Lang 1996). 
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attention to art enriches knowledge of the law and legal education. This 
list does not and cannot aim to be exhaustive, and the categories are not 
entirely exclusive, as several of the classifications overlap with each 
other. However, the list expresses a greater series of interactions and 
provides a more comprehensive approach to understanding the 
relationship between art and law than typically described m 
h I h. 110 sc oars 1p. 
i. Art Portrays Law 
One of the most obvious points of intersection between art and law is 
the category of artistic works that describes the workings of a legal 
system or legal order. The law and literature movement is closely linked 
to this category. A hallmark of law and literature scholarship is analyses 
of literature about legal themes, ranging from works of literature with 
explicitly legal themes, such as A Jury of Her Peers and Billy Budd, to 
works of literature with legal themes woven into a larger story, such as 
Cider House Rules. 111 
Beyond literature, the art and ornamentation of courtrooms or the 
architecture of legal buildings, for example, sheds light on how a legal 
system projects its physical image. 112 Spatial arrangements within a 
courtroom, such as where the judge positions himself or herself, how the 
lawyers position themselves vis-a-vis decision makers and their clients, 
and whether the space accommodates a jury, elaborate on the self-image 
of a legal system. 13 By understanding how a legal system is represented 
in the physical space and icons of legal arenas, students gain a better 
understanding of how a legal system conceives of itself and represent its 
aspirations to others. An example of scholarship in this mode is Dennis 
II 0. Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation, 5-9, 23, 207, 317 
(Harv. U. Press 1988) [hereinafter Posner, Law and Literature]. Posner identifies five broad 
categories as "[t]he most important connections between law and literature," id. at 5-9, and classifies 
his book into three parts: "Literature on Legal Themes," id. at 23, "Law as a Form of Literature," id. 
at 207, and 'The Regulation of Literature by Law," id. at 317. See Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead, 
Introduction, in Law and the Image: The Authority oj'Art and the Aesthetics of Law l, II (Costas 
Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., U. of Chi. Press 1999) (Douzinas and Nead place art into two 
categories: legal influences over art and artistic portrayals of law.); Hilde Hein, Law and Order in 
Art and Law, in Law and Literature Penpectives, supra n. I 09, at I 09-32 (Hein discusses the 
relationship between art and law via two topics: the role of order as a common point in art and law 
and the influence of law and art on each other.). 
Ill. Camilleri, supra n. I 08, at 581-93 (analyzing A Jury of" Her Peers); Posner, Law and 
Literature, supra n. 110, at 155-166 (discussing Billy Budd); Bruce L. Rockwood, Abortion Stories: 
Uncivil Discourse and "Cider House Rules," in Law and Literature Per.1pectives, supra n. 109, at 
289-340 [hereinafter Rockwood, Abortion Stories]. 
112. See e.g Piyel Haldar, The Function of the Ornament in Quintilian. Alberti. and Court 
Architecture, in Law and the Image, supra n. II 0, at 117-36. 
113. /d. at 130-136. 
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Curtis and Judith Resnik's examination of depictions of the Virtue of 
Justice. 114 By tracing the evolution of Justice from a wide-eyed Goddess 
to today's blindfolded protector of impartiality before the law, and 
through examining other works of art used in legal spaces, Resnik and 
Curtis illuminate the ways in which legal systems have relied on images 
to consolidate their power and project their authority within concrete 
I I 115 ega spaces. 
At the most basic level, these works of art provide descriptive 
evidence of the law's workings in a specific context. Cider House Rules 
outlines the boundaries of abortion law in the early twentieth century. 116 
Courtroom architecture details the role of legal actors within the 
judiciary. 117 At a richer level, these stories and works of art, including 
ones that deal more subtly with legal themes, also provide deep insight 
into the material and emotional effects of law on society. 
Several works of music are also particularly powerful in providing 
deeper insight into the legal frontier. The plethora of music relating to 
labor, for example, provides deep insight into principles related to 
contracts in the context of employment. Many songs describe the effects 
of unfair labor practices, as in Sarah Gunning's song, "Come All You 
Coal Miners:" 
Dear miner, they will slave you 'til you can't work no more 
And what' II you get for your living but a dollar in a company store 
A tumbled-down shack to live in, snow and rain pours in the hop. 
You have to pay the company rent, your dying never stops. 11 
Such songs often mobilized the will of the workers to organize in an 
effort to level the bargaining power between employer and laborer. 
Gunning sings in the same piece: 
They take your very life blood, they take our children's lives 
They take fathers away from children, and husbands away from wives. 
Oh miner, won't you organize wherever you may be 
And make this a land of freedom for workers like you and me. 119 
Contemporary works of music, from modern folk to rap, also shed 
light on the law. In country music, the son~s of the late Johnny Paycheck 
describe legal subjects including labor1 0 and the Internal Revenue 
114. Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik. Images ofJustice, 96 Yale L.J. 1727 ( 1987). 
115. !d. at passim. 
116. See Rockwood, Abortion Stories, supra n. Ill. at 302-22 (discussing Cider House Rules). 
117. Haldar, supra n. 112, at 117-36. 
1!8. Sarah Ogan Gunning, Come All You Coal Miners, http://www.fortunecity.com/tinpan/ 
parton/2/comcall.html (accessed Mar. 23, 2006) (based on liner notes from Rounder 4005, 1972). 
119. !d. 
120. Johnny Paycheck, Takes This Job and Shove It, in Take This Job and Shove It (Laserlight 
1992) (CD). 
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System. 121 The music of Bob Dylan also touches frequently on legal 
themes, describing in The Lonesome Death of Hattie Carroll, for 
example, how money and influence shield some criminals from 
. h 122 pums ment. 
Art in this vein serves to document the life of the law in society and 
its effects on individuals' lives. This is one of the most powerful 
dimensions of art. It serves as a constant reminder that law is not simply 
an enterprise limited to a courtroom and judicial opinions. Unfortunately, 
traditional legal education materials mask this larger story of law. 
ii. The Forces and Problems that Inform Law Inform Art 
This heuristic is the counterpoint to the previous model. The 
previous model places law at the center and uses works of art to 
illuminate law. The present model looks at the sources that influence 
both law and art. In this understanding, discrimination as it is portrayed 
in art, for example, is not merely an attribute of the legal system but a 
larger force in society that surfaces in multiple phenomena. Issues that 
affect law, such as the role of judgment, also affect other dimensions, 
including art. In effect, the social forces that manifest themselves in law 
are also manifested in art. Several works of scholarship express 
variations on this theme. 
Several works of scholarship highlight how the identity crises 
stemming from understandings of modernity and postmodernity have 
surfaced in both law and art. Nathaniel Berman skillfully illustrates this 
connection in an article that examines legal modernism in the interwar 
period in Europe and artistic modernism as expressed in Pablo Picasso's 
Les Demoiselles d'Avignon. 123 While this article is not specifically 
linked to any one of the typical first-year legal subjects, it would 
complement any legal course through its discussion of the forces that 
influence legal development. 
In negotiating modernity, art and law also have felt similar conflicts 
arising from the battle between tradition and innovation, but Costas 
Douzinas and Lynda Nead suggest that, unlike law, art has been more 
successful in expanding its boundaries and accepting new forms of 
representation within its rubric. 124 Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin 
also draw on crises in modernism to highlight the link between art and 
121. Johnny Paycheck. Me and the IRS, in Take This Joh and Shove It, supra n. 120. 
122. Bob Dylan, The Lonesome Death of Hattie Carroll, in The Times They are A-changin · 
(Columbia 1964) (CD). 
123. Nathaniel Berman, Modernism. Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of Reconstruction, 4 Yale 
J.L. & Humanities 351, 358-60 (1992). 
124. Douzinas & Nead, supra n. II 0, at l. 
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law in their article by comparing the debate over the authentic 
performance of early music to issues of authenticity in the law. 125 
iii. Law and Art Demand Judgment 
Oliver Wendell Holmes cautions, "It would be a dangerous 
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves 
as final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations outside of the 
narrowest and most obvious limits." 126 His attention to the dangers of 
judicial power raises the question of what subjects judges are competent 
to judge. By the very nature of legal work, judges and legal professionals 
constantly define which objects of human interaction may be subject to 
the force of law, just as judges of art dictate which representations are 
worthy of the name "art" and the protections that adhere to such a 
designation. In this understanding, the problem of judgment is not 
limited to the sphere of a judge encountering an unfamiliar work of art. It 
represents a more fundamental controversy, one which divorces legal 
judgment from artistic evaluation, 127 and creates deep suspicion of one 
side toward the other. 128 
iv. Art Unearths Law's Origins and Describes Its Alternatives 
Art in this scheme is characterized by works like Albanian writer 
Ismail Kadare's book Doruntine, in which a young man returns from the 
grave to fulfill a promise to escort his sister, Doruntine, back to her 
native village. 129 The man, Constantine, had held a unique philosophy 
during his life that explained his actions after death. 130 
[He] was opposed to existing laws, institutions, decrees, prisons, police, 
and courts, which he considered no more than a pack of coercive rules 
raining down on man from the outside like hail. He believed that these 
laws ought to be abolished and replaced by inner laws arising from 
within man himself. By this he did not mean purely spiritual standards 
dependent on conscience alone, for he was no na"ive dreamer who 
assumed that humanity could be ruled solely by conscience. He 
believed in something far more tangible, something the seeds of which 
he had detected scattered here and there in Albanian life in recent 
125. Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other PajiJrming Arts, 139 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1597 (1991). 
126. Douzinas & Nead, supra n. II 0, at I. 
127. See id. at 1-5 (discussing the "aesthetic question"); llcin, supra n. 110, at 111-12 
('Today, under the new rules of postmodernism, it is quite possible to claim authority for oneself-
but it counts for less since anyone can claim it."). 
128. Douzinas & Ncad, supra n. II 0, at 4. 
129. Ismail Kadarc, Doruntine (Jon Rothschild trans., New Amsterdam Books 1988). 
130. !d. at 158. 
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times, something he Jfid should be nurtured, encouraged to blossom 
into a whole system. I. 
249 
The basis for this order was the bessa, the inviolable promise. 132 And so, 
in the end, after all the townspeople had demanded who could have 
brought Doruntine back, the answer was clear: a promise mightier than 
death. 133 
Art as a description of the law's origins portrays the roots of a legal 
idea, explores the boundaries of custom and law, and illustrates the 
alternatives to legal order. Examples of such art also include depictions 
of restitution in Icelandic sagas and revenge stories in Greek and 
Elizabethan literature. 
Richard Posner has contributed greatly to the exploration of the 
law's origins by his examination of such Greek and Elizabethan 
stories. 134 His analysis of the legend of the House of Atreus, which 
describes a cycle of violence that includes a man feeding his enemy 
brother the body of his son, 135 illustrates the destructive effects of private 
revenge and describes the founding of a legal court as a remedy for the 
. I 136 
vto ence. 
"Before the Rain" is another example of revenge as an alternative to 
formalistic legal order. This movie, set in modern Macedonia, 137 
describes the circle of violence sparked when an ethnic Albanian girl 
131. /d. 
132. !d. at 159-62. 
133. !d. at 163. 
134. Posner, Law and Literatur!!, supra n. 110, at 33-34 (discussing Greek and Elizabethan 
literature). 
135. !d. at 33. 
136. ld at 33-44. Posner, the enfant terrible of the law and economics movement, is an odd 
figure in the law and literature field. His seminal work on the subject, Law and Litera/uri', first 
claims that "the extent to which law and literature have been mutually illuminated is modest." !d. at 
13. Posner thus sees limited utility in the discipline and argues, for example, that tools of literary 
analysis provide little assistance in understanding legal texts. !d. at 247--58. Alongside Posner's 
efforts to debunk the law and literature movement arc numerous examples of how literature, in fact, 
illuminates legal issues. /d. at 33-44. 
Posner's book contributes a useful classification scheme to the law and literature 
movement and skillfully connects several works of literature to legal ideas. Posner decries the 
narrowness of legal training, and casts doubt on the skills of lawyers in literary analysis due to the 
shortcomings of their training. Yet, he also repeatedly shows that literature unveils new dimensions 
of law not visible in legal training, id. at passim., and he directly admits that literature is a useful tool 
for expanding lawyer's breadth of the law. Se!! id. at 165. He notes, for example, that "the concept of 
law is not exhausted by its conventional associations with rules and objectivity. The fact that 
literature can help us see this is one of the fruits of the law and literature movement." !d. at 165. By 
the end of his book. after having set forth several creative analyses, Posner admits that he has "a 
warm though qualified enthusiasm for the field of law and literature." !d. at 353. 
137. Macedonia is known officially as the Republic of Macedonia. Macedonia, Territorial 
Disputes, www.worldstatcsmen.org/Macedonia.htm (accessed Feb. 25, 2006). 
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kills an ethnic Macedonian man who attempts to rape her. 138 Her act sets 
off a cycle of revenge between Albanian and Macedonian neighbors and 
eventually between family. When the Albanian girl refuses to abandon a 
young Macedonian monk who has protected her from an angry mob, the 
girl's cousin kills her. At the movie's end, the story returns to the 
opening scene, su~~esting that the cycle of events is to continue in a 
never-ending loop. 9 
Both the House of Atreus 140 and "Before the Rain" paint a bleak 
picture of worlds that have not internalized ordered legal means of 
settling disputes, yet the legal alternatives have their own shortcomings, 
as other artistic works have shown. Posner cites E.L. Doctorow's 
Ragtime as an example of a corrupt legal system that denies formal 
justice to African-Americans. 141 By contrasting portrayals of formal and 
informal mechanisms of ordering, students can better realize the 
potentials and drawbacks of formal legal systems and work toward 
opening spaces for reform within legal orders. 
v. Art and Law Embody Power 
The influence and role of power in art and law is a disputed point of 
commonality between the two disciplines, centering mostly on the extent 
to which art embodies power. None of the participants in this debate 
denies the position of law as a conduit for power. By comparing and 
contrasting the role of power in each field, students who study this 
debate better understand the magnitude and role of the power they will 
inherit when they enter the legal profession. 
Richard Posner argues that the judge, as a public f~ure, embodies 
power in a more tangible way than the literary critic. 14 The judge, he 
argues, has greater power than the critic to enforce his interpretations on 
others. 143 
138. Before the Rain (Polygram Video 1994) (motion picture). Set against the backdrop of 
conflict in Yugoslavia, the movie is geared toward an international audience. It is not necessarily a 
wholly accurate portrayal of present-day Albanian and Macedonian societies, but it has great value 
as an illustration of how cycles of revenge might play out in areas with firmly entrenched customs 
that coexist alongside other systems of ordering. !d. 
139. !d.; see also The Internet Movie Database, Plot Summaryj(>r Before the Rain, http://www 
.imdb.com/title/tt0110882/plotsummary (accessed Feb. 25, 2006) (offering a brief summary of the 
movie Before the Rain). 
140. Posner, Law and Literature, supra n. 110, at 33-44. 
141. /d.at46. 
142. !d. at 287 ("Holmes had said such things before he was appointed to the Supreme Court, 
but for a Supreme Court Justice to say them carried greater weight." (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
The Path of the Law, I 0 Harv. L. Rev. 457 ( 1897) (address delivered by Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes at the dedication of a new building))). 
143. !d. 
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Levinson and Balkin dispute such claims as they relate to the field of 
music. 144 Musical notations, such as an oddly placed F-natural in a 
Beethoven piano concerto and an unusual repeat in a Schubert sonata 
"appear to be law-like commands."145 In response to law and literature 
scholar Robin West's assertion that only "legal interpretation is an act of 
power," 146 Levinson and Balkin assert that her argument "borders on the 
nalve." 147 "One does not have to be a Nietzschean to recognize the 
struggles for power and prestige involved in debates over artistic 
interpretation," they explain. 148 "Indeed, the essays in Authenticity and 
Early Music speak of nothing so much as the battle for authority between 
early music acolytes and their traditional opponents." 149 
Perhaps, however, Levinson and Balkin overlook a key difference 
between the role of power in the law and the role of power in early 
music. Artistic authority indeed is an arena for power struggles, but it 
represents a sphere of authority that one submits to more voluntarily than 
the sphere of authority enacted by a legal system. Nonetheless, the scope 
of the debate forces more careful reflection for students on the nature of 
legal power. 
The opportunity for the manifestation of power is not limited to the 
separate manifestations of authority described in the debate by Posner, 
West, and Levinson and Balkin. Douzinas and Nead offer evidence of 
150 . 
another aspect of power for art. If art d1d not have power, they 
contend, it would not be subject to the regulation of the law to the extent 
it is today. 151 Art has the power to challenge, offend, and upset 
sensibilities. From the homoerotic photography of Robert Mapplethorpc 
to feces-smeared depictions of the Virgin Mary, art exudes a threat to the 
sensibilities that are captured in law, and law has responded by 
constraining the range of art's authority. 
The notion of power inherent in art illustrates the power struggle that 
exists between law and the subjects of its regulation even beyond art. 
While many people may see homosexuality as a natural sexual 
orientation worthy of protection, portrayals of homosexuality in art may 
be seen by some legislators and judges as such a powerful challenge to 
"proper" values that they use censorship to repress what the art 
144. Levinson & Balkin, supra n. 125, at l59X-l614. 
145. !d. at 160X. 
146. !d. at 1612. 
147. !d. 
148. !d. 
149. !d. (citing Richard Taruskin, The Pas/ness olfhe Present and the Presence of the Past, in 
Authenticity and Earlv Music A ,\)•mposium, 139 (N. Kenyon ed., Oxford U. Press 1988). 
150. Douzinas & Ncad, supra n. 110, at 6-9. 
151. !d. at 7. 
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represents. A perceived role of power, whether in a work of art or an act 
of love, challenges legal actors to intervene and exercise power to 
preserve their own, though sometimes skewed, values. 
vi. Law Regulates Art 
This category includes the various subjects typically included under 
the category of Art Law, such as First Amendment issues, tax law, 
entertainment law, cultural heritage law, and intellectual property law. 
Issues of authority to judge and issues of power, as discussed above, 
necessarily surface in this category. Despite Holmes' assertion that art 
and law are separate arenas that should not meet, 152 judges frequently 
encounter artistic questions in the courtroom. 
Many of the issues in this category are especially well suited to an 
upper-level class devoted specifically to Art Law or to classes in subjects 
like intellectual property or First Amendment law, but they may also be 
introduced more briefly within the first-year class. Students could study 
property law cases that include aesthetic considerations, for example, or 
civil procedure cases that involve disputes over cultural objects. 
vii. Aesthetic Dimensions ofLaw 
Some legal scholars have aimed to find aesthetic value in the work of 
lawyers. This effort sometimes results in wholly positive assessments of 
the creative role of lawyers. Under this paradigm, law is not merely a 
technical craft but an artistic venture, and the lawyers' craft embodies the 
aesthetic principles that define beauty in art. Scholars who adhere to this 
outlook include Indiana University School of Law Dean Alfred C. Aman, 
Jr.-who sees law students as "aspiring artists" 153 and some legal 
problems as "high art" 154-and, to a certain extent, James Boyd White, 
who writes his book on the legal imagination, sees the student "as an 
artist" 155 who is "as free" as the sculptor or painter in what she or he 
156 does as a lawyer. 
These positive portrayals rightly challenge the notion of law as an 
enterprise of "plugging and chugging" rules into a specific legal case. 
152. Daniel J. Kornstein, The Double Life o{ Wallace Stevens: Is Law Eva the "Necessarv 
Ang<'f" o{ Creativl' Art", 41 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1187, 1193 (1997) (quoting Oliver Wendell 
llolmes). 
153. Alfred C. A man, Jr., Celebrating Law and thl' Arts, 2 Green Bag 2d 129, 130 ( 1999). 
154. !d. at 129. 
155. White, supra n. 108, at xxv. White adds as a note of caution that the student is also "as 
responsible" for his or her actions as the sculptor or painter. /d. Given the possible limitations of this 
comparison, as discussed in the model of law and art as conduits for power, White may overlook the 
lilCt that the implications of legal creativity may reach further than artistic creativity. 
156. !d. 
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Yet as an enterprise that includes space for creativity, law also creates a 
space for dangerous manipulation inherent in the creative process. 
Aesthetic outlooks on law can overestimate the positive attributes of the 
creative process, 157 and efforts to achieve aesthetic excellence in law 
have been criticized as inappropriate "in a field of pain and death." 158 
Other scholars have aimed to provide a more neutral aesthetic view 
of law that does not strive for beauty in the legal process but rather aims 
to discern a series of aesthetic arrangements that describe different 
understandings of law. Pierre Schlag, for example, formulates several 
aesthetic models of law as visual mappings that may apply to such 
outlooks of law as legal formalism and policy-based schools of 
thought. 159 Schlag asserts that the aesthetic ideal that attaches to the 
formalistic model-law as a grid that compartmentalizes and binds-also 
describes the dominant mode of pedagogy in American legal 
d . 160 e ucat10n. 
viii. Legal Texts as Literary Texts 
This mode of understanding looks at the artistic qualities of legal 
documents and finds that literary style is more than a rhetorical flourish 
or a nod to the aesthetic qualities of law. Here, the legal text draws on 
literary technique to enhance its power of persuasion. Two examples of 
literary writings can be found in the works of Oliver Wendell Holmes 
and Karl Llewellyn. 
Holmes separated law from art. "[T]he law is not the place for the 
artist or the poet," he asserted. 161 Yet as Daniel J. Komstein points out, 
Holmes himself accommodated art in his legal works. 162 Holmes' stature 
as a judge, Komstein argues, came partly from his skills in writing legal 
157. Jerome Frank lambasted judges who focused their career on the aesthetic attributes of 
their decisions at the expense of the lives their decisions affected. Frank, supra n. 39, at 1310 ("But 
such a decision often means death or imprisonment or poverty or a ruined life to some mere mortal 
who, in his benighted ignorance, has more regard for his own welfare than for the aesthetic delights 
of pure 'jurisprudence.'"). See also infi·a n. 251 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of 
Riss). 
158. Pierre Schlag, Tlu.' Aesthi!lics of American Law, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1047, 1050 (2002) 
(quoting Robert M. Cover, Violence and !he Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986)). 
159. /d. at 1051-5?. 
160. !d. at I 068. 
161. Kornstein, supra n. 152, at 1193 (as quoted in Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Profession 
o(the Law: Conclusion of a recture Delivered to Undergraduates of Harvard University Fehruary 
17, 1/i?I(J, in The t;ssential llolmes: Selections .fi'om !he Lellers, Speeches, Judicial Opinions, and 
Other Writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., 218, 218 (Richard A. Posner ed., U. of Chi. Press 
1992). 
162. !d. 
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texts. 163 His prowess depended, then, on his powerful and effective use 
of language. 
Karl Llewellyn exercised his literary skills in numerous formats, 
from poetry and satirical essays 164 to law review articles. 165 N.E.H. Hull 
sees the strena,th of Llewellyn's arguments in the literary language of his 
scholarship.' "Ferment is abroad in the law," Llewellyn begins in Some 
Realism About Realism, 167 "The sphere of interest widens; men become 
interested again in the life that swirls around things legal. Before rules, 
were facts; in the beginning was not a Word, but a Doing." 168 As Hull 
points out, the tone of this article served both as a persuasive method of 
writing169 and as a way of subverting the dreary formalism of typical 
legal scholarship. 170 
ix. Law as Story/Drama 
Law in this vein is a story and a performance. Lawyers perform plays 
within the courtroom. They recount stories designed to persuade. 
Whether in an individual trial or across the multiple cases that form our 
canons of doctrinal learning, law here provides its own narrative. 
Examples of this idea of law as story include this very Part's articulation 
of a legal subject as a complex story to be presented as a historical 
narrative. 
x. Art and Law Impose Visions (~{Order 
This mode explores structural similarities between art and law in 
projecting their own systems of ordering. Scholars who have written in 
this field often focus specifically on the roles of both art and law in 
imposing order onto chaos. 171 This position incorporates strains of the 
"creative ideal" discussed in aesthetic considerations the mode of law 
163. /d. 
164. N.E.H. Hull, The Romantic Realist: Art, Literature and the EndurinK Lega(y of Karl 
Llewellyn's Jurisprudence, 40 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 115. 117 ( 1996). 
165. !d. at 120 n. 25. 
166. !d. at 120. 
167. !d. 
168. !d. at 120 (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism --RespondinK to Dean 
Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222 ( 1931 )). 
169. !d. ("It was Llewellyn's poetic style in his legal writings that I believe has been one of his 
enduring attractions for legal scholars."). 
170. !d. at 120-21. 
171. See Hein, supra n. II 0, at I 13 ("From an obverse perspective, the examination of art 
through the speculum of its legal control and legitimation suggests the extent to which the very 
concept of art (and its instances) is embedded in the morality, commerce, politics and social 
stratification of culture."); Kornstein, supra n. 152, at 1240. 
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that considers aesthetic dimensions, but in a less enthusiastic way. 
Exploring systems of ordering, whether they are legal, artistic, or other, 
raises several questions about the regimes we impose on organic patterns 
of daily life. How do we identify disorder and chaos, and are systems 
that aim to order always preferable to chaos? What forms of chaos might 
systems of order themselves engender? By exploring broader questions 
about order and control, students better understand potentials and 
shortcomings of the legal system and may begin to think about 
alternative methods to the conventional forms of ordering encompassed 
in legal regimes. 
xi. Artistic Devices as Tools of Analysis 
The law and literature movement frequently cites this mode of 
comparison in its work. In this scheme, tools of literary analysis are used 
as devices to interpret legal texts. One such tool involves "the liberation 
of the text from the author." 172 As a literary device, it allows the reader 
of the text to introduce her or his own meaning to the words on the page 
and embrace the text as a device that outlives its identity as the creation 
of a set moment in time and space. 173 As a legal tool, it enables legal 
scholars to interpret ambiguous texts and look beyond the text to 
extrinsic evidence that may inform the legal document's usefulness in a 
174 
contemporary context. 
Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin have extended this heuristic to 
tools of musical interpretation. 175 One aim of their article on debates 
over early music is to demonstrate how ideas gleaned from the 
interpretation of musical texts also bear relevance to issues of judicial 
interpretation. 176 The analogy is especially apt. Although works of 
literature are reenacted each time they are read, 177 the reading of 
literature tends to be a more private act than the performance of music or 
the interpretation of a legal document. 
172. Camilleri, supra n. 108, at 569 (citing J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal 
Theorv, 96 Yale L.J. 743, 746 ( 1987)). 
173. !d. at 569~ 70. 
174. See id. (citing J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and /,ega/ Theory, supra n. 172, at 
779~80) ("Recognizing that language is essentially the use of abstract symbols to convey ideas, the 
deconstructionist asserts that intersubjective meaning is only possible if those symbols have a public 
interpretation divorced from, and not necessarily identical to, the intent supra n. 125, at 1598~ 1614. 
175. Levinson & Balkin, supra n. 125, at 1598-1614. 
176. !d. 
177. !d. 
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xii. Art Redefines What it Means to Think Like a Lawyer 
Training students to "think like a lawyer" is a frequently professed 
goal of American legal education. Although defined in different ways by 
different people, the dominant interpretation of this catchphrase is that 
law school inducts students into a special way of critical analysis 
uniquely suited to legal issues. "Thinking like a lawyer" is often equated 
with a type of cool-headed analysis, cultivated by the Langdellian 
method, which works as an antidote to acting on emotion rather than 
reason. In sociologist Robert Granfield's fieldwork at Harvard Law 
School in the mid-to-late 1980s, he observed professors defining the 
framework of legal analysis throu~h admonitions to "calm down ... 
[and] approach this like lawyers." 1 8 Students told Granfield that they 
were chided by faculty members when they introduced "political, ethical, 
1" 179 d' . I d' . 180 Th. d. . I d I or mora Imenswns to a c ass Iscusswn. IS tra Ihona mo e 
of thinking like a lawyer-equating legal analysis to a mode of thinking 
that need not reference moral, political, or other concerns-conforms to 
the standard model of American legal education that emphasizes a 
certain form of technical rigor at the expense of other heuristics. 
Fortunately, other law professors have held a more nuanced 
interpretation of what it means to think like a lawyer. Anne-Marie 
Slaughter has defined thinking like a lawyer as a way of "thinking with 
care and precision, reading and speaking with attention to nuance and 
detai1." 181 Slaughter couples this technique with "attention to context and 
contingency" and argues that lawyers need not sacrifice their own values 
for the sake of being able to make an argument on either side of an 
issue. 182 Rather, this skill allows students to understand that "there are 
arguments on both sides" and that lawyers must be receptive to multiple 
arguments. 183 In the end, she concludes that thinking like a lawyer is not 
a dehumanizing process. She states, "[t]hinking like a lawyer is thinking 
like a human being, a human being who is tolerant, sophisticated, 
... I d d,l84 pragmatic, cntica , an engage . 
Professor Slaughter opens the door to a broader understanding of 
what it means to think like a lawyer, and art expands this concept. 
Literature sensitizes us to the forces of the law. It encourages empathy 
and vigilance to the human dimensions of law. As Marijane Camilleri 
178. Granfield, supra n. 65, at 75. 
179. !d. at 76. 
180. !d. at 75-76. 
181. Anne-Marie Slaughter, On Thinking Uke A !.awyer (copy on tile with the author). 
182. !d. 
183. !d. 
184. !d. 
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notes, "By reading literature, the lawyer can learn to recognize the 
familiar human needs, h~es, and hurts in the unfamiliar situations of the 
people he represents." 18 It works as a remedy to the "narrowness" of 
professional training criticized by Posner by encouraging well 
roundedness and culturalliteracy. 186 
"Images speak, they are neither mute nor lifeless blocks ... Images 
open the heart and awake the intellect." 187 The eighth-century author of 
this quote lived in a time when illiteracy was the norm and images 
played a different role in society, 188 and yet his words resonate even 
today. Art helps inject a necessary dose of emotion into what it means to 
think like a lawyer, but it need not come at the expense of our intellect. 
To the contrary, art enhances our intellect. 
It is entirely appropriate to consider the role of emotion in legal 
training, for even if some forms of legal analysis shut out emotional 
considerations, real-life legal problems do not. Lawyers confront 
emotional situations on the job, and spending three years pretending that 
emotion plays no role in the law cannot adequately prepare students to 
work as lawyers. By reserving a place for emotion within the legal 
classroom, students learn how to conduct legal analysis within the 
context of emotionally or morally difficult cases. They learn to confront 
their own emotions and to navigate legal problems that involve 
emotional considerations. A legal classroom that shuns all emotions 
anesthetizes students to the full force of the law. 
xiii. Art Expands Our Arsenal of1deas 
The arts increase the law student's legal vocabulary and widen the 
arsenal of ideas to use in legal analysis. As a response to Bentham's 
assertion that poetry has no more use than child's play, Hilary Putnam 
wrote that "[Great poetry contributes to] the enlargement of our 
repertoire of images and metaphors, and the integration of poetic images 
with mundane perceptions and attitudes that takes place when a poem 
has lived in us for a number of years." 189 Exposure to various facets of 
legal experience through the arts endows students with a greater 
"repertoire of images and metaphors" to draw on in legal analysis and to 
carry with them in their legal careers. This expansion of the arsenal of 
ideas also provides a powerful justification for expanding legal 
185. Camilleri, supra n. I 08, at 564-65. 
186. Posner, Law and Literature, supra n. II 0, at 175 ("Professional training in law and the 
professional experiences of lawyers are narrowing."). 
187. Curtis & Resnik, supra n. 114, at 1746. 
188. /d. 
189. Posner, Law and Literature, supra n. II 0, at 302. 
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imagination to non-western perspectives (discussed later in this Part) and 
confirms the general need to include a wide array of disciplines to 
challenge the tunnel vision of ordinary legal education. 
With an expanded repertoire of ideas about law, law students are 
better positioned to conduct their work critically, carefully, and 
creatively. By drawing inspiration from postmodern art's outreach to 
new forms of representation, legal innovators may look to non-traditional 
approaches to meet legal needs or solve legal problems. By probing 
commonalities between modernist movements in art and law, students 
better understand the outside forces that bear on both disciplines in 
specific contexts. The arts promote the legal imagination by providing 
both the context and the inspiration to draw on a diverse set of 
disciplines with which to think about legal problems. More knowledge 
about the law also draws students' attention to the wider variety of 
contexts in which they might work as lawyers, thus counteracting the 
tendency of law students at some schools to gravitate toward only a 
select handful of legal jobs, such as corporate work. 
xiv. Art as Communicator of Legal ideas 
Art functions as a type of legal communication in at least three ways: 
as testimony, legal discourse, and form of education. 
(a). Testimonial Values ofArt 
This understanding of law is closely connected to the idea of art 
portraying law. This mode includes such typical representations of law in 
works of art and also includes works of art that serve as historical 
evidence of law's great failings: Holocaust literature, for example, or the 
poetry of victims of repressive legal regimes. Art as a testimonial 
communication serves a documentary function. It tracks law's 
performance and details its successes and its shortcomings. 
(b). Art as Legal Discourse 
A legal text with the characteristics of a literary work is one model of 
art as a form of legal discourse. This mode also includes the use of visual 
images to make legal arguments, such as images of indigenous art to 
promote indigenous rights laws or posters or murals used to advance 
legal and political arguments. 
(c). Art as Educator 
Art in this mode communicates legal ideas to populations unfamiliar 
with legal concepts. It includes Chinese propaganda posters that 
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publicize legal ideas and songs or images that inform people of elections 
d . h h 190 H . h . . . .:: f an mstruct t em ow to vote. arnessmg t e tmagmattve 1orce o 
art, this mode of communication provides a source of creativity for 
expressing legal ideas. Art here need not simply be a messenger of legal 
ideas to the larger community of citizens; it can also be a messenger of 
ideas to law students. 
xv. Art Completes the Legal Narrative 
The preceding categories of the intersections between art and law 
offer a range of methods for completing law's story in the first-year legal 
classroom. Art complements social science and philosophical 
introductions to law, for example, by revealing additional dimensions to 
law. The arts illuminate a specific legal discipline, as is the case with a 
work of literature that portrays the criminal justice system or a song 
about the failings of labor contracts. They also provide insight into 
broader legal issues, such as the roles of intent and authenticity in textual 
interpretation, and invite understanding of the influence of historical 
events in the development oflegal ideas, such as crises in modernism. 
The teacher committed to relaying law's story in the first-year legal 
classroom may rely on various combinations of legal and artistic 
interaction to convey the story of law. The use of art with legal themes 
and art that portrays alternatives to law may fill out most of law's 
narrative. Students may watch movies or documentaries that portray 
legal events. The teacher might also introduce scholarly articles that 
discuss other ways of using art and law, such as Levinson and Balkin's 
article 191 or excerpts of White's writings on imagination in legal 
thinking. 192 Students could view wampum belts to understand what 
contractual arrangements looked like in the context of Amerindian 
treaty-making or look at posters that publicize legal ideas to a general 
audience in contemporary China. The goal of this exercise is to fortify 
law's story and thereby open law students to a rich world of law beyond 
its depiction in American legal textbooks. 
xvi. Globalizing the First-year Classroom 
The preceding examples of how to broaden the portrayal of law have 
drawn on several examples outside the American experience. As law is 
190. Pedro A. Malave!, Literature and the Arts as Antisubordination Praxis: LatCrit Theory 
and Cultural Production: The Confessions of an Accidental Crit, 33 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 1293, 
1316 (2000) (Mala vet cites the example of songs used in 1950s that Puerto Rico used to educate 
voters about an upcoming election.). 
191. Levinson & Balkin, supra n. 125. 
192. White, supra n. I 08. 
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certainly older than its incarnation on American soil, an examination of a 
legal subject's history necessarily demands an examination of non-
American legal systems. However, gaining a global perspective of law 
extends beyond simply providing the historical context of an American 
legal subject or completing the story of the evolution of modern-day 
American law. Knowledge of non-American systems has value in its 
own right. 
The appropriateness of integrating non-American perspectives into 
an academic setting is generally accepted in non-legal American 
institutions of higher learning, 193 but unfortunately the presence of non-
American perspectives must be justified within legal academia. The title 
of John Merryman's book, The Loneliness of the Comparative Lawyer, 
conveys the difficulties of scholars who specialize in non-American legal 
subjects. 194 Finding acceptance within legal academia is a challenge for 
any scholar who deals in non-American legal subjects, whether it is 
comparative law, foreign law, or international law. 
Recent trends provide some indication that law schools are becoming 
more aware of the need to integrate global perspectives. As legal and 
other spheres of interaction increasingly span national borders and 
increased migration sustains international issues within national borders, 
some schools have made steps to adjust their curricula accordingly. Most 
notable is the University of Michigan's decision to make a course in 
"transnational law" a required class for all students as of the 200 I ~2002 
academic year, 195 marking the first time a law school has made 
knowledge of non-American legal systems a requirement for 
graduation. 196 New York University's Global Law School, launched in 
1995, has carved out institutional space for global perspectives. 197 Its 
worldview has also trickled into the general curriculum via efforts to 
integrate global perspectives into its JD classes. 198 The Washington 
193. Certainly, scholars in undergraduate institutions debate whether or not a canon of learning 
should include non-western perspectives, and scholars of non-western subject matters may 
sometimes find themselves marginalized by some college administrations. Despite these 
controversies, disciplines that reference mostly non-American subject matter-ranging from the 
Romance languages to Chinese history-have a fairly safe existence within academia. If anything, 
the increase in opportunities to interact with non-United States cultures should only stimulate more 
student interest in pursuing these disciplines. 
194. John Henry Merryman, The Loneliness o/the Comparative Lawver: And Other Hssays in 
Foreign and Comparative Law (Kluwcr L. Inti. 1999). 
195. Jeffery Atik & Anton Soubbot, International Legal Education, 36 Inti. Law. 715, 717 
(2002) (citing U. of Michigan L. School, Law School Course Descriptions -Transnational l"aw, 
http://cgi2 .www.law.umich.edu//_CiassSchedule/CourseList.asp (updated Feb. 25, 2006)). 
196. !d. at 715. 
197. Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, International Legal Education: International Legal 
Developments in Review: 1999, Public International Law, 34 Inti. Law 817,822-23 (2000). 
198. Zahralddin-Aravena, supra n. 197. 
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College of Law at American University has also made a systematic effort 
to integrate global studies into its school, including both international 
perspectives within the classroom 199 and the opportunity to participate in 
clinics and research centers that involve transnational issues?00 Other 
schools have made more modest yet equally important efforts to 
globalize the classroom; New England School of Law, for example, has 
provided funding to instructors of first-year classes for curricular 
development that includes global perspectives.201 Casebook publishing 
also reflects a trend in the inclusion of more international 
. 202 perspectives. 
Schools that have included foreign, international, and comparative 
perspectives in their curricula recognize the value that comes from 
looking outside one's own legal system. Global perspectives enrich legal 
learning on several levels. On one level, students learn more about their 
own system by comparing it to other legal systems. They discover the 
American system is not the only way to structure law, and they become 
better able to critically evaluate their system in light of alternatives that 
exist elsewhere?03 
Student also better understand what "law" is when viewed in a more 
holistic context. Like a historical introduction to a legal subject, an 
international introduction gives students the tools to better probe the 
make-up of the various legal concepts they encounter in law school. It 
also provides the groundwork for studying how law intertwines with 
b 'ld. d . I . 1 204 state- m mg an state power m mu tip e contexts. 
Global education also more adequately prepares students for 
practicing law in the twenty-first century. Business deals today may span 
multiple continents; American lawyers may find themselves working 
outside United States borders or dealing with issues that involve multiple 
jurisdictions?05 Within the United States, issues of immigration and 
asylum touch on non-American legal systems, as well as international 
law. 206 It may be unrealistic to expect law schools to train lawyers to be 
199. Claudio Grossman, Building the World Community: Challenges to Legal l:'ducation and 
the WCL Experience, 17 Am. U. Inti. L. Rev. 815, 828-38 (2002). 
200. !d. at 838-55. 
201. Toni M. Fine, Introduction and Overview-Working Together: Developing Cooperation 
in International Legal Education, 20 Penn St. Inti. L. Rev. I, 4 (200 I). 
202. See e.g. Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, International Legal Education: International 
Legal Developments in Review: 2000, Public International Law, 35 Inti. Law. 793,794-97 (2001 ). 
203. See e.g. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Symposium: Dealing in Difference: Comparative 
Law's PotentialjiJr Broadening Legal Perspectives, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 657, passim ( 1998). 
204. John A. Barrett, Jr., International Legal Education in U.S. Law 5j'chools: Plenty of 
Offerings but Too Few Students, 31 Inti. Law. 845, 849 ( 1997). 
205. See e.g. Nagle, supra n. I 04, at II 06. 
206. ld 
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as equally versed in foreign law as in American law, but an introduction 
to general families of legal systems or an overview of legal systems in 
different countries paves the way for better informed American lawyers, 
whether they work in a corporate firm or an asylum clinic. 
Instruction specifically in international law prepares students for a 
field of law that has exploded since the Second World War. The 
establishment of temporary and permanent international criminal 
tribunals, the proliferation of human rights treaties, and the growth of 
development and trade projects provide new arenas for using 
international legal knowledge. 
Despite numerous factors illustrating the real necessity for 
integrating global perspectives in American law schools, some law 
schools have responded with indifference, claiming that law is still 
primarily a domestic matter?07 This resistance may mirror the same 
ideological underpinnings that support continued use of the Langdellian 
method, described by Claudio Grossman as a pedagogy "born in an era 
dominated by the principle of national sovereignty."208 While the 
presence of at least one course that deals with non-American subject 
matter has become the norm at American law schools,209 many law 
schools fail to provide the push to study these subjects. As a result, many 
students graduate law school without meaningful exposure to global 
I I . 210 ega perspectives. 
In a 1996 survey of seventy law schools, John Barrett found that only 
thirty-seven percent of students in the sample graduated with a course in 
an international legal field? 11 Although his survey covered a cross-
section of schools that included top-ranked national institutions, large 
state schools, and local law schools, Barrett estimates that his figures 
may be on the high side, due to factors such as the inclusion of schools in 
his sample that are located in cities with strong international presences, 
such as Washington, DC.212 Although every school in his survey offered 
classes on transnational subjects, a significant increase from the seventy-
nine percent of schools found to offer such classes in a survey from the 
!960s,213 the number of students taking such courses had barely 
207. Grossman. supra n. 19'1, at 817. 
20g. !d. at 820. 
20'1. Barrett, supra n. 204, at 854 (citing a survey by the International Legal Education 
Committee of the ABA's Section on International Law and Practice). 
210. /d. at 854 (only thirty-seven percent of law students graduate with a course in 
international law). 
211. !d. at 854. 
212. /d. 
213. /d. at 852 (citing Richard W. Edwards, International Legal Studies: A Survey of Teaching 
in American l.aw Schools /963-/964 5 (Am. Socy. of Inti. L. 1965); John King Gamble, Teaching 
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Barrett suggests that the easiest way to remedy this problem is to 
include global perspectives within regular core classes? 15 Requirements 
like those at the University of Michigan are also effective, but given the 
tardiness with which such policies might be implemented and the 
institutional determination required to carry out such curricular reform, 
the globally minded law professor may find the first-year class the ideal 
place to introduce international perspectives. Indeed, in the first-year 
classroom described in this paper, such an international perspective is 
essential in providing a well-rounded legal education. 
However, efforts to internationalize legal education must not 
succumb to the pressures of eurocentrism that has gripped even the 
seemingly cosmopolitan venture of comparative law. Certainly, close 
attention to European legal systems is a fundamental step in broadening 
one's horizons beyond the United States, 216 but excessive attention to 
European systems as objects of comparison can channel even the most 
committed comparativists into a parochial mindset. Franz Wieacker, for 
example, concludes his otherwise learned treatment of civil law by 
stating that developing countries should adopt European law because 
their own legal orders fall short of well-functioning legal systems? 17 
Meanwhile Rene David and John Brierly justify comparative law in part 
to facilitate "dealings with representatives of far eastern countries who, 
with their very different intellectual processes, contemplate law and 
international relations in a manner very different from those in western 
countries. "218 Alas, the myth of an unknowable Orient has yet to be 
cracked even by otherwise skilled comparativists. Such comments reflect 
a superficial understanding of legal systems beyond the European 
continent. 
Ignorance of non-western systems also undermines larger efforts to 
understand the law. Roberto Unger's early attempt to construct a theory 
of legal ordei 19 was based in part on a description of Chinese law that 
International Law in the 1990s 121 (Society 1993)). 
214. Barrett, supra n. 204, at 854. 
215. /d. at 856. 
216. Not only do the systems have value for comparison in their own right, but they also serve 
as the bases for formal legal systems in many other parts of the world. 
217. Franz Wieacker, Foundations of European Legal Culture, in Comparative Legal 
Traditions 18, 36-3 7 (Mary Ann Glendon et a!. eds., West Publg. Co. 1994 ). 
218. Rene David & John E. C. Brierly, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An 
Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law 9 (3d ed., Stevens & Sons Ltd. 1985). This comment 
reflects a welcome sensitivity to different understandings of law, but it also incorporates strains of 
deeply rooted stereotypes-perpetuated in part by some East Asian scholars themselves-about a 
unique Asian mindset that resists legal consciousness. 
219. Roberto Unger, Law in Modern Society 86-110 (Free Press 1976). 
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was inaccurate.220 As noted by William Alford, such a misrepresentation 
not only does an injustice to Chinese history but also pokes holes in 
U ' . . fl I 221 nger s categonzatwn o ega systems. 
Attention to a multitude of legal systems enriches the project of 
understanding law. First, knowledge of legal systems inside and outside 
of Europe broadens the law student's arsenal of legal ideas. Second, 
many of the issues raised in comparative law inquiries can be best 
answered by looking beyond the West. Issues oflegal transplantation, for 
example, are illuminated not only by transplantation within the context, 
for example, of the European Union framework, but also beyond Europe, 
where there is a long history of legal borrowings within and across 
regions. 
Finally, works of art and literature as they illuminate legal ideas must 
look beyond the western school of thought. James Boyd White, 
defending his use of western texts, argues, '"I make no claims for the 
priority of this culture ... or for these texts, but I do for their value. "'222 
How unfortunate that White and some of his colleagues know enough 
that works of literature can open the door to broader legal learning, yet 
fail to draw on the true greatness of art and literature that can be found in 
non-western works. 
xvii. Testing the Liberal Legal Classroom 
You are the curator of a traveling exhibit on tort law that will visit 
many countries across the globe. Your job is to give a general critical 
overview of torts that is not grounded solely in the doctrine's 
development in one particular country or in one particular era. You may 
use numerous media-paintings, photography, panels of text, 
documentaries, historical artifacts, to name only a few-in this exhibit. 
Please describe what objects you will use and how they will combine to 
present your story of torts. Feel free to attach illustrations to your 
explanation. 
A multidisciplinary unit that portrays law's history through historical 
narrative is well served by a tool of assessment that allows for the 
creative incorporation and synthesis of the many ideas learned in this 
unit. The above essay questions demands that students digest what they 
have learned and reveal that they have made the material their own by 
telling their own story of a legal discipline. 
220. !d. at 86--107; William P. Alford, The Inscrutable Occidentaf! Implications ol Roberto 
Unger's Uses and Abuses of'the Chinese Past, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 915, 952-53. 
221. Alford, supra n. 220, at 952-53. 
222. Rockwood, supra n. I 09, at 4 (quoting James Boyd White, Acts of' Hope: Creating 
Authority in Literature, Law, and Politics 80-81 (U. of Chi. Press, 1994)). 
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Students also might be called on to display their knowledge in 
another manner. The mere questions, "What is property law? What are 
its potential advantages and its potential shortcomings?" demand that 
students work out their own expertise on the topic. This unit portrays a 
legal subject as a complex animal, and a deceivingly simple-sounding 
question, such as "What is contracts?" forces students to probe the very 
core of the legal subject they are studying. 
Students could also be asked to engage specifically in a cross-
disciplinary comparative exercise. For instance, students might be asked 
to discuss a concept that illuminates contract law, providing several 
. . I I 221 A h ""II . . " concrete, ongma examp es. · mong sue 1 ummatmg concepts 
students could look to economics, feminist jurisprudence, poetry, 
linguistics, or marriage practices, to name a few. Students here must look 
beyond the notion of a legal topic as a fully independent body of law 
unaffected by other considerations. 
Any one of the preceding topics might be assigned as a five-page 
essay to evaluate student progress in the course. The professor might 
assign the topic early on in class, to give students time to carefully think 
about the issue. In evaluating the essay, the professor should measure 
students not only on their ability to synthesize the ideas learned in class 
but also on their skills in thinking beyond the class materials and 
developing thoughtful insights into the legal subject. 
III. AMERICAN VERSIONS OF LAW, AMERICAN CHALLENGES TO THE 
LANGDELLIAN METHOD 
The previous Part described a vision of pedagogy centered on subject 
matter often unfamiliar in the first-year classroom. The final Part, which 
focuses on skills-based training, deals with a more familiar yet still 
marginalized form of legal training. The present Part, in contrast, 
concerns the central foundation of American legal education, namely, the 
examination of United States legal doctrine. It is here, then, that an 
examination of the typical features of an American legal education-case 
materials, Socratic questioning, and issue-spotter exams-is most 
appropriate. The first three sections of this Part describe and critique 
these three aspects of standard legal education, and the final section 
offers a comprehensive proposal for redesigning instruction in American 
law. 
223. This question is modeled after an essay question used by Harvard Law Professor Christine 
Jolls in her Fall 2000 contracts class. 
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A. Beyond the Casebook: Challenging Current Teaching Materials 
The diet of first-year law school students consists largely of edited 
appellate decisions dissected into component parts in student case briefs. 
A typical brief might read as follows: 
Riss v. City of New York (Court of Appeals ofNew York, 1968)224 
Facts: Riss twice unsuccessfully sought police protection after ex-
boyfriend stalked and threatened her. The day after the second time 
help was denied, hired thug threw lye in her face, burninf and blinding 
her. Lower courts dismissed and affirmed the dismissal? 5 
Issue: Can the police be sued for failing to protect? 
Held: No. Affirmed. This case is different from cases where 
governmental actions have displaced/supplemented traditionally private 
enterprises, like hospitals, where ordinary principles of tort have 
followed with abolition of immunity. This is also different from 
government activities like providing highways, etc., where ordinary tort 
laws may also apply. Here, the case "involves the provision of a 
governmental service to protect the public generally from external 
hazards and particularly to control the activities of criminal 
wrongdoers. The amount of protection that may be provided is limited 
by the resources of the community," :fff by legislative-executive 
decision on how those resources are used. 
As discussed in Part I, such case material was a cornerstone of 
Langdell's pedagogy. Legal ideas, according to Langdell, were best 
distilled from select cases that cumulatively contained a complete body 
of legal rules. The need to single out cases best suited to this purpose-
for not all legal cases fit into Langdell's project-led to the development 
of casebooks.227 The realists of the early twentieth century reformed 
case books to include outside materials, but the basic idea of the casebook 
as a collection of appellate legal decisions, possibly adorned by snippets 
of legal scholarship or other materials, remains a standard ingredient in 
legal education.228 Under this model, students subsist on a daily reading 
load of cases, condense the main points of the case into a brief or rely on 
briefs prepared by others, including commercial legal publishers, and 
then condense the case again into an outline to be used during the final 
224. 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968), overruled, Simpson's Food Fair, Inc. v. Evansville. 272 
N. E.2d 871 (Ind. App. 1971 ). 
225. !d. at 862. 
226. !d. at 860. 
227. Weaver, supra n. 57, at 569. 
228. !d. at 569-70. 
227] "ART FOR A BETTER LIFE" 267 
exam. Hence, Riss v. Ci(v o{ New York229 evolves over the course of a 
semester from the longer brief, above, to a few lines in a subcategory of a 
neatly organized list of legal rules on torts: 
Government Liability 
a. Riss: Police cannot be sued for failing to protect P from abusive 
boyfriend b/c the case "involves the provision of a governmental 
service to protect the public generally from external hazards and 
particularly to control the activities of criminal r:rongdoers." The 
degree of protection may be limited by the resources. 30 
The process of rewriting a case into a brief and connecting its 
principles to other ideas within a legal subject is one of the perceived 
benefits of the case method. Its advocates praise the case method for 
teaching students to "think like lawyers," to understand legal texts, to 
discern the relevant holding of a decision, and to connect a court holding 
to rules gleaned from other cases. 231 In a precedent-based system, 
moreover, it is seen as especially appropriate to base teaching materials 
. d" . I d . . 232 OnJU lCia eCISIOnS. 
The endeavor is, in effect, one of reconstruction. Students take apart 
a case in preparation for class, reorganize it into a brief, then later use the 
ideas from the case as a building block for an outline designed to 
represent torts, contracts, or another first-year subject. Although 
classroom discussion of the case provides guidance to the student in 
understanding the rule at hand, much of this process of construction is 
meant to take place outside the classroom; hence the case method is also 
lauded for promoting independent thinking skills?33 
Anthony Kronman adds to these positive assessments of the case 
method by asserting that such a method also cultivates "moral 
imagination."234 Assuming that the law instructor uses the case materials 
as a basis for exploring the different positions embodied in the case, 
Kronman argues that students develop their imagination as they are 
forced to examine different perspectives?35 Over time, the practice of 
seeing different sides of a case becomes "habitual."236 This process, as 
229. 240 N.E.2d 860. 
230. !d. 
231. Weaver, supra n. 57 at 547, 549. 
232. See e.g. id at 547-561, 553. 
233. Ruta K. Stropus, Mend ft. Bend ft. and Er:tend It: The Fate of' Traditional Law School 
MethodolO!,')l in the 21st Century, 27 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 449,450.467-68 (1996). 
234. Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawver: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession 113 
(Belknap Press of Harv. U. Press 1993 ). 
235. !d. at 113. 
236. !d. at I 14. 
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carried out through the case method, Kronman concludes, "works 
simultaneously to strengthen both the student's power of sympathetic 
understanding and his ability to suppress all sympathies in favor of a 
judge's scrupulous neutrality."237 This latter power is one of the ultimate 
benefits of the process, as "the student himself takes on a measure of the 
public-spiritedness that distinguishes the judge's view of legal 
conflict."238 Kronman justifies the case method not only for the inherent 
value of these specific skills but also because these skills may work to 
reclaim a lost ideal of the "lawyer-statesman" within American 
society.239 Speaking in the manner of a Confucian scholar yearning for 
the Golden Age of the great sage kings, Kronman identifies a crisis of 
conscience in the legal profession;240 cultivating moral judgment via the 
case method serves, to him, as one antidote to this troubled world of the 
present-day legal profession. 
The notion that the case method encourages moral imagination, or, 
as other advocates suggest, promotes analytic skills, overlooks the 
serious shortcomings of the case method. Certainly, the close reading of 
a judicial decision coupled with careful note-taking in the form of a brief 
promotes useful skills. Lawyers should be familiar with reading legal 
decisions and analyzing individual cases within a larger context, both of 
which are skills that the case method arguably advances, but the case 
method alone fails to fully develop the skills needed to be a good lawyer. 
The case method focuses only on a small picture of the legal process, 
typically the level of decision-making in appellate courts. Kronman 
justifies this by claiming that appellate decisions "have the advantage of 
bringing out the legal issues in a case with an economy and a precision 
that trial transcripts, for example, rarely do."241 Such an economy can be 
helpful given the time constraints within the classroom, but that reason 
alone should not crowd out examination of some legal cases all of the 
documents involved, rather than just the appellate decision. 
The legal process is more complex than the economic portrayal of 
legal facts within appellate decisions. As Russell Weaver points out, the 
issues within a lawsuit that most affect its outcome may be present in the 
pre-appellate stages of a case, and typically lawyers first confront a legal 
problem from its beginning, not at the appellate level of the legal 
237. !d. at 113. 
238. !d. at 119. 
239. !d. at 1-7. 
240. !d. This resemblance to Confucian modes of romanticizing the past was first noted in 
William P. Alford, 0( Lawvers Lost and Found: Searching /(n· Professionalism in the People's 
Repuhlic o(China, in East Asian Law and Development: Universal Norms and Local Culture 191 
(Arthur Rosett eta!. eds., Routledge/Curzon 2002). 
241. Kronman, supra n. 234, at I I 0. 
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process.242 Students who study only appellate decisions do not confront 
this reality and thus miss out on the cultivation of legal skills at other 
stages of a legal problem.243 They also miss out on the larger world of 
law that extends beyond the judiciary. 
Exposing students to legal materials at stages prior to the appellate 
level and in forms outside the judiciary, in sum, more accurately captures 
the nature of the legal ideas students aim to learn from appellate 
decisions and the nature of legal work students will confront after 
graduation. Jerome Frank advocated this very approach to legal 
education, stressing the importance of factual issues in the work of 
lawyers: 
In most suits, no disagreement arises about the rules, and the disputes 
relate solely to the facts. Decision in such suits, says many a professor, 
quoting Cardozo, leave "jurisprudence ... untouched." That is true, 
provided you so conceive of "jurisprudence" that it stays aloof from the 
affairs of ordinary men. But such a decision often means death or 
imprisonment or poverty or a ruined life to some mere mortal who, in 
his benighted ignorance, has more regard for 2is own welfare than for 
the aesthetic delights of pure "jurisprudence.',2 4 
The legal process is not only more complex than appellate decisions. 
It is, as Frank eloquently suggests, also more complex than a world of 
law limited to legal decisions in general.245 Indeed, Frank was among the 
realist voices pushing to situate legal cases within a broader social 
context beyond mere legal documents. First, confining the case of Riss v. 
City o( New York246 to a simple fact-pattern and case summary, for 
example, does not develop the range of issues presented in the case. 
Next, the job of the lawyer is not simply to process and apply a rule 
about police liability but to understand what forces support the rule and 
what issues intersect with the rule. A lawyer who aims to understand the 
broader thrust of the law on society must look beyond •the outward rule 
of Riss v. City o( New York247 to fully comprehend what rules of liability 
mean. Finally, a legal professional dissatisfied with such a rule must 
understand its implications in their entirety if she or he is to work to 
change it. 
In Kronman's model, however, the broader issues of the case might 
be best left to the imagination. Specifically, he argues that students can 
242. Weaver, supra n. 57, at 570 71. 
243. !d. 
244. Frank, supra n. 39, at 1310. 
245. ld 
246. 240 N.E.2d X60. 
247. /d. 
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cultivate their moral imagination through appellate cases because the 
succinct nature of the cases demands that students fill in the gaps for 
themselves?48 This process of imagining the specific details of a case is 
troubling, however, when students have no general background 
knowledge of the issues involved in a case in which to root their moral 
imaginings. Perhaps some students studying Riss would be inclined to 
imagine away the epidemic of domestic abuse entirely. 
Education centered on the examination of cases alone fails to capture 
the wider life of the law. A typical summary of Riss v. City of New 
York249 -"Police cannot be sued for failing to protect P from abusive 
boyfriend b/c the case involves the provision of a governmental service 
to protect the public generally"-does justice neither to the lives affected 
by the decision nor to the law students struggling to understand the 
meaning of the law and the meaning of their future profession. A 
classroom that looks beyond Riss v. City of New York250 as portrayed in a 
textbook provides an excellent angle through which to explore the law's 
intersection with domestic violence, or, perhaps more accurately, its 
frequent failure to intersect in this "private" sphere, as well as issues of 
judicial lawmaking. 
The Riss case also presents a springboard into the question of what 
law means in the lives of individuals. Students might read background 
articles, such as scholarship on domestic abuse and newspaper articles 
describing the attack on Ms. Riss, to understand how the decision 
affected Ms. Riss's life. Students might explore the afterlife of the Riss 
decision, not only its effect on Ms. Riss but also its effect on various 
I. . I 251 po ttlca movements. 
Finally, the issues included in a case might be expanded beyond their 
American context to look at how similar legal issues are dealt with in a 
different legal system. Casebooks consist almost exclusively of 
American cases, with the occasional bow to commonwealth legal 
decisions?52 The almost wholly domestic focus of case materials is yet 
another limitation on the horizon of American legal education. 
Certainly, some professors stray from the case method or supplement 
248. Kronman, supra n. 234, at 116. 
249. 240 N.E.2d 860. 
250. !d. 
251. For example, the Riss case has been co-opted by pro-gun groups to show the necessity of 
gun ownership for self-defense in light of a police force not compelled to protect women from abuse. 
See e.g. Sixgunncr, Do You Have a Right to Police Protection~ 
http://hematitc.com/dragon/policcprot .html (last updated May 12, 2000); Sixgunner, Gun Control, 
http://www.sixgunncr.com/guests/ guncontrol.htm (no longer available, accessed at 
http:/web.archive.org/web/200306220 12955/http: //www.sixgunncr.com/guests.guncontrol.htm 
(Sept. 20, 2005) ). 
252. Weaver, supra n. 57, at 569- 70. 
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cases with outside reading. Those who add supplemental material within 
the basic framework of a case-centered class may find, however, that 
students fail to attach significance to non-case-centered materials, 
viewing such additions as mere "embellishment."253 Weaver argues that 
professors themselves promote this rule obsession among students.254 
The narrowness of the case method and of the final exam work to create 
an atmosphere in which students come to understand that rules matter.255 
Professors question why their students want to learn black-letter rules, 
Weaver notes, yet throu~h their pedagogy, professors help reinforce the 
message that rules count. 56 A course that aims to portray a legal subject 
primarily through appellate cases sets the default mode of the course to a 
narrow body of materials that, at best, provides a highly edited glimpse 
of one aspect of the law,257 and at worst, distorts how the law operates. 
Finally, the case method is problematic because it has become so 
standardized in its content, delivery, and evaluation techniques that 
students need only tum to the many study aids, most notoriously canned 
briefs and outlines, that do the work for students and eliminate the need 
to conduct independent critical thinking. The format of many study aids, 
like the case method itself, discourages a wide view of legal principles. 
Study aids summarize cases. Linda Riss becomes yet another rule within 
an outline, and the issue of domestic violence is pushed to the side. It is 
terrifying to think about a generation of lawyers whose imagination, 
moral or otherwise, has been shaped by the commercial outlines of 
Emmanuel's and Gilbert's. 
B. The Socratic Method 
In contrast to Japanese university students who do little more than 
listen passively as their professors lecture, Harvard law students 
participate actively in classroom debate and work with their i/Sstructors 
to make their law school education as rewarding as possible.25 
This quote comes from Yukio Yanagida, a Japanese lawyer who 
received an LL.M. from Harvard Law School, where he also spent time 
as a visiting professor. In Japan, legal education is an undergraduate 
253. Seligman, supra n. 6, at 157-58 (describing the views of Harvard Law School Professor 
Richard Parker). 
254. Weaver, supra n. 57, at 565-66, 580. 
255. /d. at 577, 565-66. 
256. /d. at565-66,577,579-80. 
257. The facts of a legal case are not only edited in the process of creating appellate decisions, 
but also edited by casebook authors. Students examine a legal issue several levels removed from the 
original legal problem. 
258. Yukio Yanagida, A New Paradigm jiJr Japanese Legal Training and Education In Light 
of the Legal Education at Harvard Law School, I Asian-P. L. & Policy J. I, 7-8 (2000). 
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major. In comparing Japanese law students (the passive listeners) to 
Harvard Law School students (the active participants),Yanagida reflects 
widely held assumptions about the lecture method of teaching-the 
typical tool of American undergraduate education as well as Japanese 
legal education-and the Socratic method of teaching used not only at 
Harvard but also at other American law schools. 
Supporters of the Socratic method have long lauded the "active 
learning" which the method is meant to cultivate and which is thought to 
stem from the method's rigorous in-class questioning. Lawyers, after all, 
must learn to think quickly and argue their position eloquently in front of 
others. In its standard form, the professor selects a student to describe a 
case assigned for the day. Then, moving from student to student, the 
professor quizzes the class on the case. Through a process of back-and-
forth-questioning, the professor guides the student toward an articulation 
of the ideas expressed in the case. The professor may ask one student a 
series of questions or divide the questioning among a number of students. 
She or he may ask students to argue positions on both sides, and then 
may adjust the facts of the case, offering a "hypothetical" to see how the 
rules of the case might function in a different fact pattern. In its purest 
form, this questioning process takes up the entire class session. The 
professor neither lectures nor provides answers. Students are forced to 
develop conclusions on their own based on the guidelines provided by 
h ~ ' . . 259 t e pro1essor s questwnmg. 
The reality, of course, is much different. Few professors fill an entire 
class period with Socratic questioning. As Friedland's survey suggests, 
professors ma,Y intersperse other teaching techniques with Socratic 
questioning?6< Further, the nature of the teaching method termed 
"Socratic" varies tremendously in style. Professors may incorporate the 
element of surprise, a key factor in forcing students to think on their feet, 
by randomly selecting students, or they may notify students in advance 
that they will be called on. A student may be questioned for much of the 
class period
6 
or the student may be only one of many called on to 
participate? 1 The professor may pride himself or herself on the 
adversarial nature of the process, grilling students harshly and perhaps 
publicly critiquing those who perform poorly, or the professor may 
question students in a less confrontational manner. Finally, the 
questioning can range from those closely tailored to the case to broader 
259. See e.g. Phillip E. Areeda, The Socratic Method, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 911, 914-15, 922 
(1996). 
260. Friedland, supra n. 79, at 27. 
261. Arccda argues that the best approach is to call on many students. Arccda, supra n. 259, at 
916. 
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0 h )' 0 d d 262 questiOns t ate tctt more open-en e answers. 
The late Harvard Law School professor Phillip Areeda was a staunch 
defender of the method. 263 Though he recognized the potential of misuse 
of the method, such as when a professor uses the method as a form of 
public humiliation, Areeda argued that the method is an effective way to 
educate Jaw students.264 Areeda noted that the risk of being questioned 
promotes vicarious participation?65 He envisioned the Socratic method 
as a carefully orchestrated event where students cultivate their own 
analytic skills as they engage in the questioning process?66 Yet, they are 
not completely left to their own devices in gaining insight into the law 
because students are "carefully led to [their discoveries] by skillful 
0 0 ,267 questwnmg. 
Other Socratic method supporters have offered wholesale praise for 
the method, without Areeda's detailed differentiation between proper and 
improper uses of the method. University of North Carolina law professor 
Martin Louis, in an interview shortly before his death, described the 
method as "a friendly assault."268 According to Louis, the point of the 
method was to teach students "analytical thinking" and, as an added 
bonus, gave students "a little practice in oral communication."269 Ruta 
Stropus is even more adamant in her support for the Socratic method. 
Speaking of the "Langdellian method," including the Socratic 
questioning that adheres to it, she asserts that 
[I]f law schools lower their standards and alter their methodology, 
ultimately the law students will suffer. Untrained in independent 
thought, critical analysis, and verbal communication in their 
undergraduate education and not fully exposed to it in their legal 
training, law students will enter the Ie;~I market completely unprepared 
to face the challenges that await them. 0 
For Stropus, the Langdellian method, complete with its Socratic 
questioning, is the only way to effectively educate students. To her, the 
method stands for a type of rigor lacking in undergraduate education. 271 
262. This open-ended type of questioning is frowned upon by Areeda./d. at 913. 
263. See id at passim. (defending the benefits of the Socratic method). 
264. /d. at 918. 
265. /d. at 916. 
266. /d. at 911-22. 
267. /d. at 922. 
268. Bumele V. Powell, A /Jefi!nse of the Socratic Method: An Interview with Martin B. Louis 
(1934-94), 73 N.C. L. Rev. 957,961 (14)5). 
269. /d. at 970. 
270. Stropus, supra n. 233, at 473. 
271. Interestingly, Lani Guinicr, Michelle Fine, and Jane Balin, who are heavily critical of the 
Socratic method, also equate the method with rigor. Despite the shortcomings in the method that 
they identify, they advocate that Jaw schools still retain "rigorous Socratic teaching." Lani Guinier et 
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The Socratic method has become a powerful symbol for all that is 
right, or all that is wrong, with American legal education. For its 
adherents, the Socratic method is rigor. It represents the high standards 
upheld in an idealized past and, in their view, is increasingly under fire 
by assertive students and radical professors like the "crits."272 The 
Socratic method is a key to developing the analytical skills needed to 
"think like a lawyer." To opponents of the method-and indeed this is a 
method of such forceful symbolic value that it has not merely critics but 
actual opponents-the method stands for the ills of modern-day legal 
education. The problem is pathological. The method transmits a virus 
that plagues not only legal education but also law students themselves. 
Some of the strongest critiques of the method assert that it harms 
students by cultivating severe anxiety?73 Anecdotes of clever volleys 
lobbed by a particularly cruel professor bent on carrying out a one-sided 
battle hint at the extent of harm that may be inflicted on students. 
Yanagida applauds the suspense and nerves that attach to the method, 
noting, "[t]his pressure and fear of being embarrassed in front of one's 
peers, it is said, force students to be well prepared and think at a higher 
level."274 Some observers, however, see this stress as a side effect of the 
Socratic method that can overshadow the learning process. Gerald Hess 
asserts, for example, that the stressful nature of the process can cause 
students to focus single-mindedly on what they perceive as the primary 
issue of learning the rules and consequently ignore the broader issues 
connected to learning the law.275 
Stropus suggests that the Socratic method leads students to "the 
realization that law is not as certain, predictable, and ordered as many 
students expect."276 Yet the very controlled process of questioning, 
coupled with a narrow set of legal materials, deliberately overlooks the 
unpredictability that can exist in law. The Socratic method introduces 
uncertainty, but with the final goal of bringing order to that uncertainty 
to produce an outline of how a legal subject operates and to answer 
exams sometimes graded by a checklist of correctly identified issues.277 
Socratic questioning channels law through a tunnel. The narrowness of 
al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women, Law School, and Institutional Change 72 (Beacon Press 1997). 
This critique is discussed in greater detail later in this section. 
272. Kerr, supra n. 68, at 127. 
273. See e.g. id. at II g; Stropus, supra n. 233, at 458-60. 
274. Yanagida. supra n. 258, at II. 
275. Gerald Hess, Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and Learning Environment in Law School, 
52 J. Leg. Ed. 75, 80 (2002). 
276. Stropus, supra n. 233, at 458. 
277. See Philip C. Kissam, Law School Examinations, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 433, 444-45 ( 1989) 
[hereinafter Kissam, Examinations]. 
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the Socratic method reinforces the limited scope of subject matter dealt 
with in case law. Although Socratic questioning could be applied, 
perhaps quite awkwardly, to general subject matter, it is especially well 
suited to the philosophy of the case method. Yet the limited scope of the 
Socratic method is not due only to the limited scope of case material. The 
very nature of the classroom control exercised by the Socratic professor 
can crowd out examination of broader issues that attach to a case. 
Students, meanwhile, decry the process for giving professors 
unfettered power to harass students?78 Critics lambaste the method for 
its perceived inefficiency and the limited scope of material that can be 
covered. Even some of its adherents doubt that the method effectively 
cultivates speaking skills because students are seldom questioned long 
279 
enough to develop such prowess. 
One of the most powerful critiques of the Socratic method comes 
from feminist theory. In Lani Guinier, Michelle Fina, and Jane Balin's 
study of University of Pennsylvania law school students, Guinier and her 
colleagues found that "many women are alienated by the way the 
S . h d . d . I I . . "280 Th. ocratic met o Is use m arge c assroom mstructwn. IS 
detachment from the method, combined with controlling professors who 
. 1 . I . 281 l . l .c give more c ass time to rna e voices, resu ts m ower per1ormance 
rates by women, they argue. 282 Men and women enter with nearly 
identical track records of academic success, but women fall behind 
during their first year of law school, giving men an edge they maintain 
up to graduation. 283 Guinier and her colleagues conclude: "The 
performance aspect of a large Socratic classroom disables some women 
from performing up to their ~otential, especially when this teaching 
method is used to intimidate."2 4 
The Guinier perspective is integrated into debates about the different 
thinking processes of men and women, a position widely publicized in 
the works of Carol Gilligan. If women conceive oflegal ideas differently 
than men, then the questioning process fashioned by a white man and 
perfected by like-minded predecessors may work against women. 
Similarly, if women look to solve problems outside the standard Socratic 
method of confrontational inquisition, they may be disadvantaged. 
In contrast, other observers argue that the Socratic method empowers 
278. Weaver, supra n. 57, at 519. 
279. Ken, supra n. 68, at 129. 
280. Guinier et al., supra n. 271, at 28. 
281. ld at 45. 
282. !d. at 58. 
283. ld at 37. 
284. !d. at 58. 
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women. A female Harvard law professor interviewed in Orin Kerr's 
study stated that she relied on the method to ensure women were given 
an equal opportunity to speak in class. By calling on students rather than 
allowing them to volunteer, this teacher worked to avoid a possible 
d . b I . h. h I 285 gen er 1m a ance wit m t e c assroom. 
Others reject the very premise that women need safeguards against 
aggressive male students. Stropus notes that some critics assert that the 
Langdellian method hurts women, minorities, and other "nontraditional 
students" because it "reflects white male values . . . assertive, 
argumentative, confrontational, controlling, impersonal, logical, and 
abstract."286 But to her, "it is racist and sexist to suggest that peowle 
other than white males cannot master the art of intellectual dialogue."2 7 
Although Stropus takes a narrow view of the types of argument that 
can constitute intellectual dialogue, her point suggests possible 
weaknesses in some feminist critiques of legal education. Cultural or 
difference feminism remains a debated position within feminist theory. 
Most recently, post-colonial critiques have criticized older strains of 
feminism, including cultural feminism, for lacking consideration of 
diversity among women and portraying only the experiences of white 
middle-class women.288 These western feminisms work not only to 
portray women as different from men, but, sometimes, also end up 
portraying third-world women as weak and victimized. Moreover, Carol 
Gilligan's research on girls' self-esteem, which was based on mostly 
white girls who attended an elite private school, has been called into 
question by a later study finding that African-American girls in fact 
maintain high levels of self-esteem throughout adolescent academic 
. "289 
expenences. 
These critiques of cultural feminism suggest that issues of gender 
and identity in the legal classroom should be looked at through multiple 
lenses that resist generalizing the experiences of women. At the same 
time, research indicating a trend in low female performance or greater 
female dissatisfaction within the legal classroom serves as a powerful 
reminder that issues of gender discrimination should not be overlooked 
in analyzing modem legal training. Techniques such as waiting for 
several students to raise their hands rather than calling on the student 
quickest to place his or her hand in the air may serve as a safeguard to 
285. Kerr, supra n. 68, at 128. 
286. Stropus, supra n. 233, at 463. 
287. !d. at 484. 
288. Martha Chamallas, Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory 27 28, 85 -94 (Aspen Law & 
Business 1999). 
289. Am. Assn. of U. Women. Gender Gaps. Where Schools Still Fail Our Children 5 
(Marlowe & Co. 1999). 
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ensure that certain voices within the classroom~whether they are 
predominantly the voices of women or of other students who prefer to 
contemplate an answer before rmsmg their hands~are not 
. 1. d 290 margma 1ze . 
Like the case method, the well-executed Socratic method may 
cultivate some useful skills within law students, such as oral 
communication skills and quick synthesis of learned materials. When the 
pros are balanced against the cons, however, the justifications for using 
the Socratic method are weak. The Socratic method, characterized by 
ultimate control in the hands of the teacher and particularly well suited to 
case materials, constrains the broad world of law. 
C. Testing the First-year Final 
The final exam embodies a strange paradox within the first-year 
legal classroom. The classic law school exam is the notorious issue-
spotter, supplemented, perhaps, by a question related to policy?91 The 
issue spotter may span several pages as it lays out an intricate fact pattern 
of events that are meant to link a hypothetical sequence of events to the 
rules pulled from appellate cases. The question often describes the basic 
facts of a case, the kinds of issues a lawyer might confront when a client 
walks into her or his office and that he or she must develop into a 
coherent case to take to the negotiation table or trial. Therein lies the 
great puzzle of the first-year exam. After a semester of shutting out the 
initial facts in a legal problem, the trial stage, and other preliminary 
efforts, students are asked to demonstrate their prowess in 
comprehending appellate cases via an analysis of a set of facts typically 
far removed from the appellate stage in the legal :Rrocess. Advocates 
suggest that this gap tests "legal imagination," 92 but given the 
narrowness of legal training, the exam tests a form of creative thinking 
that is barely cultivated within the classroom. 
The second puzzle of the first-year final is the separation of issue-
spotters from policy questions, and, in some cases, the absence of any 
consideration at all of policy issues within the exam. When teachers tack 
a separate policy question onto an exam that consists mostly of issue-
spotter questions, they send the message that policy is somehow separate 
from standard legal problems and thus less important. In cases where 
290. Guinier suggests that this approach to calling on students, based on a Japanese technique. 
may encourage greater participation. Guinier et al., supra n. 271, at 72-73. 
291. Henderson, supra n. 95, at 431; Weaver, supra n. 57, at 577. The exam format has been 
expanded by some professors to include other styles such as short-answer or multiple-choice 
questions. Kissam, Examinations, supra n. 277, at 438-39. 
292. Kissam, Hxaminations, supra n. 277, at 440. 
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policy issues are completely absent from an exam, the only thing that 
counts is spotting the right issues. At this point, the legal exam turns into 
the children's game that appears in the Sunday comics: find the six 
things hidden in this picture. Unfortunately, the children's game may be 
a better test of skills truly needed by lawyers than the law school exam. 
The game often asks participants to find the six things wrong with a 
picture. Issue-spotter questions seldom demand that students analyze 
what might be wrong with the issues they are trained to spot. Indeed, if 
students were required to engage in such in-depth analysis, the system of 
grading whereby some professors use a checklist of issues to evaluate 
answers
293 
would be disrupted. 
Critics see other problems with the final exam beyond these two 
puzzles. First, the exam is often designed as the only tool for evaluating a 
student's grasp of the subject, and thus is meant to represent an entire 
semester or year's worth of learning. Not surprisingly, education 
literature sees such tests as having little value in accurately measuring 
the breadth of a student's learning. According to Douglas Henderson, 
"Virtually no empirical evidence, from either the psychological or legal 
research literature, confirms that law school exams reflect more than 
what a single essay can reflect."294 More accurate measures of student 
achievement require more frequent testing and opportunities for 
reflection?95 In addition, excessive focus on one exam disvalues other 
ways in which students may demonstrate their knowledge of a legal 
subject, such as through class participation, paper-writing, or 
involvement in a class internet discussion forum. 
Philip Kissam, argues that the first-year exam carries several ill 
effects. For example, it allows the professor to prioritize his or her own 
scholarshi~ and other commitments over frequent assessments of student 
progress.2 6 Also, the exam places issue-spotting as a model of good 
legal thinking and as an acceptable form of legal writing,297 and, because 
success on the exam is disconnected from classroom instruction, it 
provides little incentive for students to attend class?98 Its role in ranking 
students, moreover, caters more to the hiring policies of corporate law 
firms than the needs of students?99 
293. See e.g. Kissam, F:xaminations, supra n. 277. at 444--45 (talking about the checklist of 
issues used to grade a law school exam). 
294. Henderson, supra n. 95, at 407. 
295. ld.at411-12. 
296. Kissam. Examinations. supra n. 277. at 436. 
297. Philip C. Kissam, The Ideology o/the Case Method/Final Ewminalion Law School, 70 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 137. 184 (2001 ). 
29g_ !d. at 183-84; Kissam, Ewminations, supra n. 277. at 436. 
299. Henderson, supra n. 95. at 404; Kissam, Ewminations, supra n. 277. at l X3. 
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Of course, like many attributes of the American legal system, the 
typical law school exam carries some benefits. It tests students' ability to 
process large bodies of knowledge and apply them to specific cases, and 
it expects students to work efficiently and effectively under pressure?00 
Yet some of these positive effects, such as the learning of a large body of 
legal rules, may crowd out attention to other legal issues and force to the 
wayside secondary scholarship assigned in class as students delve into 
learning a body of law from commercial outlines. Case materials, the 
Socratic method, and the final exam all involve skills that are useful to 
the lawyer. Assuming each method is used skillfully, students learn how 
to read case materials critically, discuss their position with a critical 
opponent, and discern relevant issues from a collection of facts. But the 
possible benefits of the system seem like more of a happy accident than 
the result of a carefully considered policy for guiding students in their 
professional and intellectual development and for assessing their 
progress. 
D. Proposal 
The preceding sections outlined the shortcomings of the standard 
features of the Langdellian classroom: case-centered materials, Socratic 
questioning, and issue-spotter exams. The following proposal offers 
alternative methods designed to present a more thorough overview of the 
American legal system. 
i. Redesigning Classroom Materials 
A broad range of teaching materials, beyond the classic American 
case book, better exposes students to the reach of the law. Appellate 
decisions do trace the development of legal doctrine, but they are not the 
only sources of insight and thus should form only one part of the course 
materials used. Students might spend time studying all of the papers 
involved in the trial process of at least one case to gain a better 
understanding of legal processes. Students might also look beyond 
materials from the judiciary to works of legislation. To provide greater 
context to such primary-source materials, students should research 
secondary sources that provide narrative descriptions of a legal subject or 
illuminate a specific aspect of the legal subject. The goal here is to 
familiarize students with the contours of a subject in its American form. 
Traditional case materials give only limited exposure to a legal subject. 
Students who study torts, for example, solely through close readings of 
appellate decisions do not have the opportunity to adequately address big 
300. See Kissam, Examinations, supra n. 277, at 435. 
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issues animating the field. 
Maintaining a global posture throughout an examination of 
American law serves as a reminder that the American way need not be 
the only way. A global perspective increases the vocabulary with which 
students can examine and critique their own system. This perspective 
also enhances their global literacy and understanding of the foreign 
systems that they may encounter in their future work. 
Students in a civil procedure class might read John Langbein's 
assessment of the German legal system and the plethora of responses it 
generated?01 Langbein heaps praise on the German system for its 
fairness and efficiency, and he suggests that the costliness and 
inefficiency of the American process might be rectified by borrowing 
examples from the German model. For whatever flaws Langbein's 
article302 contains, as a glowing assessment of the German model that 
fails to seriously examine potential shortcomings in the system, it 
provides an excellent springboard from which to explore several issues in 
comparative law. First, is the German system superior? Does it function 
better than the American system in determining the truth? Is truth the 
priority of either system? Students might next examine what challenges 
exist in borrowing features of another legal system. 
In a contracts class students might compare the role of contract in 
Japan with its role in the United States. Some scholars have argued that 
cultural factors in Japan lead people to prefer simple contractual 
arrangements and to rely on other methods for ordering affairs. Can 
culture alone explain this phenomenon, if it indeed exists, and do similar 
types of informal ordering exist in the United States?303 In examining 
these questions, students explore fundamental questions about the nature 
of contract and the definition of legal consciousness. 
The arts also reinforce a broader picture of law. Amy Hilsman 
Kastely, Deborah Waire Post, and Sharon Kang Hom's textbook on 
contracts includes works of literature to complement specific cases?04 
. 3~ They pmr Lawrence v. Ingham County Health Department -a case 
holding that a free clinic is not liable for a medical error during childbirth 
301. John Langbein, The German Advantaxe in Civil l'rocedur<', 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. H23 
( 1985). 
302. !d. 
303. See Takeyoshi Kawashima, The Legal Consciousn!'ss of' Contract in Japan, 7 L. Japan I 
( 1974 ); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Pr<'liminary Studv, n Am. 
Sociological Rev. 55-67 (1963), in Japanese Law in Context 223 27, 24H--51 (Curtis J. Milhaupt et 
al. eds., Harv. U. Press 2001) (comparing the role of contract in both societies). 
304. Amy Hilsman Kastely et al., Contracting raw 304 I 0, 311 17 (2d ed., Carolina 
Academic Press 2000); Deborah Waire Post, Teaching Interdisciplinarilv. /,aw and Literature as 
Cultural Critique, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. 1247, 1257-58 (2000). 
305. 408 N.W.2d. 461 (Mich. App. 1987). 
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because the parents, as recipients of free services, did not provide any 
consideration-with Paulette Childress White's story "Getting the Facts 
of Life"-describing a young girl's trip to a welfare office-to sensitize 
students to the experience of receiving public assistance. 306 
In the arena of non-fiction literature, Jonathan Harr's A Civil Action 
. d ') d 307 g1ves a eta1 e account of the ups and downs of the legal process. His 
description of lawyer Jan Schlictmann's suit against two big corporations 
accused of polluting the water supply of Woburn, Massachusetts, 
resulting in abnormal rates of cancer in the area, would be a powerful 
h. I · b h · ·1 308 teac mg too m ot c1v1 procedure and torts classes. As discussed in 
Part IV, Harr's book would also serve as a useful way to introduce 
practice skills into the first-year classroom. 
ii. Alternatives to the Socratic Method 
The excessive control engendered in the Socratic method further 
shuts out alternative forms of discussion on a legal topic. An alternative 
to the Socratic method is to open up a legal subject via a series of lecture 
on the topic, coupled by sufficient opportunity for class discussion. The 
Socratic method is well suited to questions and answers closely focused 
on a particular subject but cannot offer the broad overview of a topic the 
way old-fashioned lecturing can. Students need more background 
information in which to root their knowledge of a legal subject, and 
lecturing provides the ideal forum for conveying a more complete picture 
of American law. 
Undergraduate educators have rightly expressed concern that lecture 
alone lacks the learning through action that is central to a liberal 
d · 109 Th 'bl h . b ·1 . e ucatwn.- ese poss1 c s ortcommgs can e eas1 y overcome m 
several ways. The professor might devote the final hour of class a week 
to a series of discussions or she or he may integrate discussion into 
lectures, giving students ample opportunity to raise questions and engage 
in discussion. Although law school classes are often larger than the 
number of students deemed ideal for small-group discussion, law school 
professors can nonetheless draw on research about discussion groups to 
facilitate class interaction. A professor may, for example, list "ground 
306. LawrC'nce v. Ingham Countv ffealth Department. 408 N.W.2d. 461; Kastely eta!., supra 
n. 304; Post, supra n. 304. 
307. Jonathan Harr, A Civil Action (Vintage Books 1996). 
308. !d. Happily. some law professors have recognized the value of this work. Mark Neal 
Aaronson notes that a number of teaching materials now exist to accompany Harr's book. Mark Neal 
Aaronson, Thinking Uke a Fox: Four Overlapping Domains of' Good Lawyering, 9 Clin. L. Rev. I, 
17 (2002). 
309. Lee S. Shulman, Profi'ssing the Uheral Arts, in Fducation and Democracy: Re-imagining 
Uhera/ /.earning in America, supra n. 98, at 164-67. 
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rules" for class discussion or pick a specific theme to link the lecture to 
1 d o • 310 C ass lSCUSSIOn. 
iii. Evaluating Students 
As noted above, literature on testing indicates that students benefit 
from frequent feedback. This Article envisions a legal classroom where 
students receive such feedback early on in their studies. By the end of the 
first unit of class, students should have put to use what they have learned 
via the essay questions described in Part II. Students can also be 
evaluated in the course's middle unit and in the final unit on professional 
training, but evaluation should not be limited to these three junctures. 
Before describing the ways of testing students' knowledge of American 
law, it is useful, then, to sketch out some other forms of evaluation. 
First, professors might look beyond performance on exams and 
consider overall class participation in evaluating students. Participation 
need not be limited to statements made in class. Students who prefer not 
to speak in class might post their comments on a class message board or 
email the professor privately. The idea here is to recognize thoughtful 
participation and steady engagement with the issues raised in class. 
Second, the professor might also allocate a small percentage of a 
final grade to class attendance. In recognizing students who steadily 
attend class and penalizing those who frequently skip class without good 
reason, the professor here instills an important lesson in professional 
responsibility. A good lawyer is a responsible lawyer. A responsible 
lawyer does not consistently skip work or disregard responsibilities. Law 
schools should instill this value of responsibility early on in legal 
education. 
In assessing student performance in the specific area of American 
law, professors might tum to take-home essay questions that allow 
students to reflect upon and incorporate the wealth of knowledge learned 
in this unit. Students might be asked to provide a critical analysis of a 
specific aspect of the legal subject at hand, such as "consideration" in the 
case of contracts, or "negligence" in torts classes. Students would be 
urged not merely to reiterate the formal rules related to these concepts 
but also to discuss the various critiques of the concepts as they have 
developed in the United States and to reference comparative and other 
perspectives where appropriate. The question should be deliberately 
open-ended, requiring students to provide their own focus and refinement 
to the question. 
310. Richard G. Tiberius, Small Group Teaching: A Trouhle-Shooting Guide 12-13, 122 
(Ontario Ins!. for Stud. in Educ. Press I 990). 
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Such an open-ended question might be coupled with similar essay 
questions or with other testing devices. A mod~fied issue spotter could be 
reintroduced here as a complement to a legal classroom that gives a more 
thorough introduction to American law. Although the standard issue-
spotter exam makes little sense in a class that has looked only at 
appellate materials, students that have spent class time looking at 
documents from various stages of a trial would be in a better position to 
analyze a legal problem at its origins, as it is usually expressed in an 
issue-spotter exam. The issue-spotter should not be limited to mere 
detection of issues. Rather, students would be required to give a critical 
discussion of the various considerations, policy and otherwise, that affect 
the case. In grading the exam, the professor would not look only to 
recitation of various rules but also to a thoughtful and well-written 
evaluation ofthe issues involved. 
IV. INTEGRATING PRACTICE SKILLS 
There are certain themes that endure throughout the story of legal 
education. Christopher Columbus Langdell as the whipping boy for legal 
education's discontents is one undying theme. The failure of legal 
education to link doctrinal training to the larger skills used by lawyers in 
practice, often called "practical skills," is another. Indeed, Langdell's 
efforts to place legal training firmly within an academic setting upset 
existing strains of legal education that relied on apprenticeship systems. 
As Langdell's method oflegal training as a professional academic degree 
became firmly entrenched in the United States, voices of opposition 
argued that excessive focus on textbook training denied students training 
in the myriad of other skills needed on the job. From Lewis Delafield's 
1876 proposal to include a year of apprenticeship after law school and 
before the bar exam311 to the realists' cry for broader training, early 
observers of legal education advocated a type of training that 
incorporated the "everyday" skills used by lawyers on the job. Reformers 
involved in the growing clinical movement in the 1960s and 1970s 
continued this battle, and have since made headway in creating space in 
legal education for non-traditional pedagogics. 
To the present day, members of the legal community have continued 
to stress the need for skills training, sometimes criticizing theoretical 
training in the process and thereby overlooking how the two modes of 
teaching might complement each other. Judge Harry Edward, in a 
311. Delafield was the president of the American Social Science Association. which was the 
predecessor of the American Bar Association. Christopher T. Cunniffe, The CasejiJr the Alternative 
Third- Year Program, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 85, 86-87 ( 1997). 
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frequently cited 1992 article, faulted elite law schools for "abandon[ing] 
their proper place, by emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of 
practical scholarship and pedagogy. "312 He expressed concern that such a 
mindset has led to '"impractical' scholars" who produce scholarship that 
• C, I h . . b 313 IS not usetu tot e practlcmg ar.· 
The 1992 American Bar Association "Macerate Report" also 
emphasized the need for law schools to include skills training. Of the 
report's ten skills identified as necessary for proficient lawyering, 
several-including counseling, negotiation, and written communication 
skills-fall outside the scope of standard Langdellian legal education? 14 
Local bar journals have also kept a close eye on trends in legal education, 
as some members of the bar criticize law schools for not adequately 
. d ;:" . 315 prepanng stu ents tOr practice. 
This Part first traces efforts to introduce more practice-related skills 
into legal education through the clinical education movement. Professors 
increasingly have recognized the value of skills training within the legal 
classroom, both as a separate class and as part of doctrinal courses; the 
final portions of this Part give an overview of such in-class training 
methods then outline a way of integrating practice skills into a classroom 
that also considers liberal learning and a reformed version of teaching 
U.S. law. The goal of this unit is to illustrate the role of practice skills as 
a complement to other forms of training. 
A. Paving the Way with Clinical Education 
Even before its heyday in the latter part of the twentieth century, 
clinical education, in one form or another, played an important role in 
diversifying legal education. The first period of clinical education, 
described by some clinicians as the "First Wave," took the form of legal 
aid bureaus or volunteer public defenders work. This work was either a 
part of the forma\ curriculum or an extracurricular activity, and there was 
little common understanding of what educational experiences comprised 
clinical education.316 The "Second Wave," given a push by student 
activism in the 1960s, saw the emergence, by the mid-1970s, of a more 
self-conscious clinical movement that sought to find a common 
312. Hany T. Edwards, The Growing Disjuncture hetween Legal Education and the Legal 
Pro/Cssion, 91 Mich L. Rev. 34, 34 ( 1992). 
313. !d. at 35. 
314. Cecilia Bryant, The Fork in the Road: The Bifurcated Purposes of" Legal Education, 71 
Fla. B. J. 48. 51 (May 1997). 
315. See e.g. Dianne Molvig, Preparingfi>r Practice, 74 Wis. Law. I 0, I 0-12, 51 (July 200 I). 
316. Margaret Martin Bany et a!., Clinical Rducation fhr This Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 
Clin. L. Rev. 1, 5-13 (2000). 
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definition of clinical work. Led by activist lawyers such as Gati' Bellow, 
the movement was typically linked to social justice activities.31 
This second wave led to the presence of clinical education across 
American law schools. In 1996 the American Bar Association changed 
its accreditation standards to require all schools to provide "live-client or 
other real-life practice experiences," although "[a] law school need not 
offer this experience to all students."318 Clinicians have suggested that in 
the current "Third Wave" of clinical education, the philosophy 
underlying clinical work will become more widesQread as schools 
integrate more practice skills throughout their curricula.319 
Despite this remarkable growth of clinical education, the story of 
clinical education is far from one of triumph. Clinicians frequently 
remark that clinical education is marginalized or undervalued in legal 
academia, as manifest by such factors as the status of clinical instructors 
(more likely to be considered instructors rather than professors) and the 
low number of credit hours assigned to clinical work. 320 Moreover, not 
all students benefit from the experience of clinical education, either 
because law schools may provide little incentive for them to take such 
opportunities or because the high-cost clinics cannot be made available 
to the entire student population. 
More fundamentally, as valuable as clinical experiences may be, they 
do not always provide students with real exposure to the range of issues 
involved in legal practice. Clinical work typically entails students 
working with legal organizations to provide legal assistance to local 
community members. As a real-world venture, some students may 
become involved in cases that provide little opportunity for substantive 
learning. A legal case may stall or end halfway through the semester, 
providing the student with little work, 321 and harried lawyers may be 
unable to take the time to properly supervise students. This might be 
especially true in extemship programs that lack extensive on-campus 
. . 322 
supervisiOn. 
In addition, the degree of responsibility given to new clinical law 
317. /d. at 13--18; Seligman, supra n. 6, at 160-173. 
318. American Bar Association, Standards .fiJr Approval of" Law Schools and Interpretations, 
Chapter 3, Program ofLegal Education~ 302(c)(2), http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/ 
chaptcr3.html (accessed Mar. 23, 2006). 
319. Barry eta!., supra n. 316, at 72. 
320. Philip G. Schrag & Michael Mcltsncr, Report ji-om a CL!oPR Colony, in Reflections on 
C/inical/.egal Fducation IS (Philip G. Schrag & Michael Meltsner, eds., N.E. U. Press 1998); Barry 
eta!., supra n. 316, at 33. 
321. See Schrag & Meltsncr, supra n. 320, at 25. 
322. Si!e Deborah Maranville, Passion. Context. and /"awyering Skills: Choosing among 
Simulated and Real Clinicallo~tperiences, 7 Clin. L. Rev. 123, 141-42 (2000). 
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students may have unintended negative consequences. Although some 
students cite their contact with real clients as strong motivation to do 
work as hard as they can for the client, students may be inclined to err 
excessively on the side of caution for fear of making a mistake perhaps 
I. ' d . 323 to a c 1ent s etnment. 
B. Simulation Exercises 
Many advocates of greater practice skills have turned to simulation 
exercises, often via collaborative or cooperative learning groups, to 
complement standard legal education. Some instructors use simulations 
as the primary mode of instruction in distinct "legal skills" classes, 
sometimes tailored to a specific theme. Nova Southeastern University 
School of Law, for example, offers two simulation tracks, litigation and 
transactions, to introduce skills specific to those fields as well as to 
integrate issues of professionalism into the instruction. 324 Other 
instructors use simulations within regular substantive courses. Paul 
Ferber, of the Vermont Law School, has used brief simulations to 
introduce students to different schools of legal thought. 325 
Simulations encompass a variety of learning techniques. Ferber says 
that simulations include, at a minimum, "the performance of a lawyering 
task," "a hypothetical situation which emulates reality," and "a 
'significant' ... period of time to perform the task."326 The simulation 
may range from a very brief in-class exercise, not far removed from the 
classic law school hypo, to a detailed multi-week project involving in-
class and out-of-class work.327 Students may be assigned to a discrete 
task, such as talking with a client, designed to promote a specific ski11 
such as interviewing techniques, or students rna¥ take part in many such 
tasks as part of a long, complex simulation.32 "Clients" may include 
volunteer law school staff and upper-level students or could be drawn 
from among the students in the class. 329 Indeed, the experience of 
323. !d. at 134. 
324. See generally Leslie L. Cooney & Lynn A. Epstein. Classroom Associates: Creating a 
Skills Incubation Processj(Jr Tomorrow's Lawyer, 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 361, 363 (20(ll ). 
325. Paul S. Ferber, Adult Learning Theory and Simulations---Designing S'imulations to 
Educate Lawyers, 9 Clin. L. Rev. 417, 421 (2002) (Paul Ferber asks students to argue an issue 
according to a specific school of thought and asks other students to render a decision in accordance 
to the different legal philosophies.). 
326. !d. at 418. 
327. !d. at 419 (Ferber classifies simulations along a continuum from "very simple" to "very 
complex."). 
328. !d. at 422-28; Judith A. Frank, l~essons and Ideas: SkiiL1· Ins/rue/ion in LarJ.:e Law School 
Classes, 3 Thomas M. Cooley J. Prac. & Clin. L. 307, 321-25 (2000). 
329. Ferber, supra n. 325, at 425, 441, 455. 
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playing a client may make students more aware of clients' needs and 
perspectives. 330 Students might be asked to keep a daily journal and 
produce legal products such as memos and briefs, and grading may be 
based on a final written product or an assessment of various work 
331 products. 
Both clinical and non-clinical instructors alike have lauded the 
benefits of simulations. Advocates of clinical work, such as Philip 
Schrag and Michael Meltsner, have used in-class simulations to 
complement clinical experiences and to allow uniform student exposure 
to certain issues that students might not confront in specific clinica!s?32 
Ferber praises clinicals for enhancing student motivation, allowing 
greater risk-taking than live clinicals, providing skills experience in less 
time than clinical work, and allowing teachers to introduce specific 
lessons in a controlled environment not available in clinicals.333 He adds 
that simulations also give students a taste of what it means to be a 
professional, and simulations can "enable students to begin to understand 
the critical importance of the human aspect of lawyering."334 Because in-
class simulations need not rely on the resources of the law school or the 
will of individual students to take clinical classes, this experience is 
available to a wide spectrum of students. 
Simulation exercises, especially when combined with other forms of 
assessment, serve as a better, more complete indicator of student 
achievement levels. Based on a study of over 500 students who took his 
"Foundation Skills" class at Fordham University School of Law, Ian 
Weinstein found that high performance on the exam component of the 
class was not correlated to high achievement scores in the simulation 
portion of the class, which tested a different set of skills than the 
exam.
335 Thus, Weinstein found "a significant degree of independence 
among the various skills law students need to develop to become 
successful lawyers."336 Noting that both exams.. and simulations test 
skills useful in good lawyering, Weinstein argues that students might 
make more informed career decisions if they had a more complete 
understanding of their strengths and weaknesses, as might be provided 
330. Schrag & Meltsner, supra n. 320, at 30. 
331. Ferber, supra n. 325, at 427; Vemellia R. Randall, Increasing Retention and Improving 
PerjiJrmance: Practical Advice on Using Cooperative !.earning in Law Schools, 16 Thomas M. 
Cooley L. Rev. 20 I, 254, 265 ( 1999). 
332. Shrag & Meltsner, supra, n. 320, at 27-31. 
333. Ferber, supra n. 325, at 431. 
334. Id at434-35. 
335. Ian Weinstein, Testing Multiple Intelligences: Comparing Evaluation hy Simulation and 
Written Exam, 8 Clin. L. Rev. 247, passim (200 I). 
336. !d. at 285. 
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337 by assessment tools that go beyond mere paper exams. 
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Simulation work is often paired with cooperative or collaborative 
work, and there are multiple ways of conceptualizing the difference 
between the two activities. Clifford Zimmerman describes cooperative 
work as "individual mastery of the subject via a group process," while 
collaborative work centers on "group work toward a unified final 
product."338 The former may be measured by individual assessment, 
such as through an exam, while collaborative work may rely, in part, on a 
group grade. Kenneth Bruffee, in contrast, suggests that collaborative 
work aims to place more initiative and control in the hands of student 
groups, while cooperative work promotes a group structure to breakdown 
. . . h 1 339 
competltwn m t e c assroom. 
In each case, both forms of group work have been praised for 
overcoming the obstacles of the traditional legal classroom and for 
encouraging active learning. Citing several studies on group learning as 
well as her own legal teaching experience, Vernellia Randall finds that 
cooperative learning improves retention and performance, aids in critical 
thinking and social skills, lowers attrition rates, imp,roves student 
attitudes, and helps students work well in diverse groups. 40 Zimmerman 
argues that group work allows students to hear different opinions and 
may even promote less adversarial approaches to legal problem solving 
once students become lawyers?41 Bruffee states that collaboration better 
prepares students for group work when "stakes are high" br offering a 
low-risk environment in which to learn to work together.34 He cites a 
study that found medical students acquired better judgment skills when 
they worked collaborative2; to diagnose a problem as an example of the 
benefits of collaboration? 3 Instructors who use simulations note that a 
significant degree of preparation is necessary to create a good simulation 
exercise, and simulation work must be followed through with significant 
supervision and feedback by the instructor.344 Finally, simulation work 
33 7. !d at 285-86. 
338. Clifford S. Zimmerman, "Thinking Beyond Mv Own Interpretation:" Reflections on 
Collaborative and Cooperative Learning Theory in the Law School Curriculum, 31 Ariz. St. L.J. 
957, 961 ( 1999). 
339. Kenneth A. Bruffee, Collaborative Learning: Higher Education, Interdependence, and 
the Authorizv of'Knowledge 88--X9 (2d ed., The Johns Hopkins U. Press 1999). 
340. Randall, supra n. 331, at 203-04. 
341. Zimmerman, supra n. 338, at I 00 I. 
342. Bruffee, supra n. 339, at 254. 
343. /d. at 12-13. 
344. Randall, supra n. 331, at 234; Zimmerman, supra n. 33X, at I 005. Of course, such hard 
work may fly in the face of standard legal education, which provides an easy out for professors who 
don't want to oversee students' education. To be sure, there are Langdellian professors who work 
hard to prepare for class, but the Socratic method and one-time, end-of-semester testing provide 
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may also provide another forum for students to understand the emotional 
d. . f I . 345 tmenswns o awyenng. 
C. Integrating Practice Skills in the First-year Classroom 
The preceding discussion articulates the need to integrate practice 
skills into theory-based training, pointing especially to the benefits 
offered by simulation activities and group work. This following section 
proposes a way of making practice skills a basis for the final unit in a law 
school class that has introduced students to a legal subject first through 
"liberal legal learning" and then through a broad-based introduction to 
American doctrine. This "practice skills" unit aims to complement prior 
units by providing a forum for students to understand the ramifications of 
theory in everyday legal settings. Because all three units are dependent 
on each other and because each contributes vital skills to lawyering, the 
phrase "practice skills," rather than "practical skills" is used here to 
avoid suggesting that theory-related units are "impractical." Rather, the 
two complement each other, and indeed, practice skills are meaningless 
and even dangerous without proper foundational knowledge. 
The practice skills unit, designed to give students a taste of legal 
practice in action, would encompass roughly the final five weeks of class 
and would integrate a mix of skills activities, ranging from simulation 
exercises to guest lectures by members of the bar and field trips to court 
or legal aid clinics. The class might begin with a one-week overview of 
practice skills, as presented through lecture, guest lecture, and videos, for 
example. Then the class might spend three weeks on an extended group 
simulation designed to teach several skills related to a specific problem 
in American law. Finally, the class could finish with a smaller simulation 
that involves an issue with global dimensions. Alternatively, the 
professor might choose to conduct a series of three or four week-long 
simulations each designed to focus on a specific issue or skill, rather than 
do one long simulation, and the professor could integrate global and 
domestic issues into some or all of these activities. 
For this portion of class, professors may design the facts of a 
simulation from scratch or model them after existing cases from legal aid 
clinics. Students might look at eviction cases, for example, or for a 
simulation with international dimensions, focus on an asylum case. 
Throughout the simulation units of class, the professor could 
supplement the work with fieldtrips, lectures, and documentaries to 
some slack for professors who do not want to exert themselves. See Areeda, supra n. 259, at 920 (for 
a description of the preparation needed for a well-executed Socratic class). 
345. Schrag & Meltsner, supra n. 320, at 2 I (noting that clinical work provides the opportunity 
to confront one's own emotions about lawyering); Ferber, supra n. 325, at 437. 
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impress upon students the nature of law practice and the scope of the 
unmet legal needs problem. In evaluating student achievement, the 
professor might inject several "debriefing sessions" throughout the unit 
to provide students with an opportunity to reflect upon their work. The 
professor might also require the submission of journals, documents, such 
as a petition to a court or a memo, and other material as a basis for 
providing a letter grade. Depending on whether the professor wants to 
emphasize collaborative or cooperative skills, part of each student's 
grade may be based on a few assignments written in a group setting, or 
the professor may focus more on individual assignments. Although a 
pass-fail grade might provide the incentive for greater risk taking, it 
would send the message that practice skills and pro bono work are valued 
less than other coursework. Thus, if letter grades are given for other units 
of the class, they should be given in this unit as well. 
Simulations, regardless of the type, provide an excellent opportunity 
to introduce not only practice skills but also issues of professional 
responsibility, specifically pro bono work. Pro bono work helps address 
the problem of unmet legal needs. While the definition of "legal needs" 
is subject to different interpretations, legal aid experts recognize in any 
case that access to legal counseling and legal services, whether defined 
as needs or as something else, is out of reach for many people in the 
United States. Legal services organizations, funded by the Legal Services 
Corporation, fill some of the gap, but only apply to the very lowest 
income population, thus still leaving many people in lower income 
b k . h . 346 rae ets wtt out servtces. 
Pro bono work has helped contribute to providing legal services. A 
1994 study indicated that three times as many legal aid-eliJ;ible cases are 
handled by private attorneys than by legal aid attorneys? At the same 
time, the number of United States attorneys who do pro bono for the poor 
is still less than one-third of the total number of lawyers. 348 Of course, 
pro bono work is not the only way to provide legal services; vouchers, 
enhanced roles for paralegals, and self-help clinics are but a few of the 
alternatives that might prove useful. 349 However, if more members of the 
bar contributed to pro bono work for the poor, more legal needs could be 
met. 
Certainly, one might argue that many attorneys are not trained in 
346. See e.g Jeanne Cham, The !LAG 2001 Convention, Papers, A Comment on the Current 
State of Government and Charitah~v Funded Legal Services/iJr the Poor in the United States 5-6, 
http://ilagnet.org/conferencc/ilag200 l.htm (last updated June 3, 200 I and paper added Dec. 6, 200 I). 
347. /d.atlS-19. 
348. !d. at 21. 
349. Many of these systems are used outside the United States. Once again, then, looking 
outside American borders proves to be of great value to American legal education. 
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legal aid issues, but if this is true, then it provides all the more reason to 
introduce practice skills to students through the lens of pro bono legal aid 
work. Law students will enter diverse areas of practice upon graduation. 
Focusing on a business simulation might provide useful skills for future 
corporate attorneys but would overlook or downplay the skills a 
government lawyer or solo practitioner might use. The one potentially 
common area of practice exists in pro bono lawyering, an act highly 
encouraged by the ABA and state bars, even if not mandated. If each 
lawyer takes his or her professional responsibility seriously, then all 
students should find pro bono skills a point of common educational 
interest. To be certain, it might be more beneficial for both the bar and 
legal aid recipients if some practitioners donate money rather than time 
to legal aid causes, but in order to even donate money, practitioners must 
first have an awareness that legal aid is worthy of support. This unit aims 
to instill that message. 
There are a growing number of mandatory pro bono requirements in 
American law schools, but they may fail to convey to students the 
necessity of doing pro bono work on behalf of people otherwise unable 
to access legal services. While Tulane University, the first school to 
institute a mandatory pro bono requirement in 1987, requires students to 
350 do pro bono work on behalf of the poor, other schools, such as 
Harvard, allow a broad range of non-profit activity to count as pro bono 
work. 351 Harvard chose this route so that its program would not "be seen 
as 'ideological, "'352 but in doing so, it downplays the crucial role of pro 
bono in securing greater access to legal aid for more people. 
Given that some law school pro bono requirements do not fully 
address the problem of unmet legal needs, the role of pro bono legal aid 
training within the classroom seems especially appropriate. By 
presenting pro bono work for lower income groups as an integral part of 
legal education, students better understand the crisis of unmet legal needs 
350. Lewis A. Calderon et a!., Mandatory Pro Bono jiJr Law Students: Another Dimension in 
l-egal Education, l.J. L. & Policy 95, I 02-{)4 ( 1993 ). 
351. Strategic Plan .fiJr Harvard Law School 43-44 (2000) (copy on file with author). Under 
Harvard's current rules, students may satisfy this requirement through "uncompensated, law-related 
public interest work on behalf of people who cannot afford (in whole or in part) to pay for legal 
services, or; for the government, or; at a non-profit organization as defined under IRS sections 
501(c)(3) & (4) protecting rights of marginalized individuals/groups or working in the broader 
public interest, or; in a law firm working on a pro bono basis." These are broad categories that leave 
terms like "broader public interest" undefined. While some of the groups included in these 
categories may promote worthy causes, the legal needs of these organizations are likely much less 
pressing than those of a low-income family facing eviction and homelessness. Harvard Law School, 
Pro Bono Service Program, http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/probono/ (last modified Feb. 6, 
2006). 
352. Strategic PlanjiJr 1/arvard Law School, supra n. 351, at 44. 
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and are better prepared to meet this challenge through their pro bono 
activities as future lawyers. This introduction to pro bono work may also 
help lead more students to legal aid-related or other community 
lawyering activities. Indeed, if students learn practice skills in class, they 
should not perceive the need to rely on corporate firms for general legal 
. . 353 
tram mg. 
The point of this unit is to introduce legal practice skills, provide 
students with the opportunity to form connections among all facets of 
their legal work, and better understand the need for pro bono work. 
Through this unit, students understand that both theory and practice have 
I . I I d . 354 a p ace m ega e ucahon. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined how a legal subject can be retold through 
three different mediums: liberal learning, the American experience, and 
practice skills. Law contains multiple layers and stories. Traditional legal 
education-case analysis as fleshed out through the Socratic method-
provides only a limited narrative of the law. It confines, 
compartmentalizes, and thus misrepresents. This misrepresentation 
carries ill consequences for American law students. In narrowing the 
blinders on the law, it narrows law students' visions of what they can do 
as lawyers. Enforcing only one type of legal analy~;s stifles creative and 
careful thinking about the law and its power. By contrast, opening law's 
core by exploring its multiple stories opens students' minds to different 
uses of the law. Accepting law as a set of principles packaged together 
into a tidy outline encourages accepting the status quo and discourages 
questioning, prodding, and reexamining law's multiple dimensions. 
Opening American law demands an integration of theoretical and 
practice-based skills into legal education. As Part IV discusses, some 
critics of American legal education point to the disjuncture between 
theory and practice as its major ill. The crux of the problem is not, 
however, that theory and practice are by their nature incompatible. 
Rather, the problem is that the specific theories taught in American law 
schools fail to complement practice. In other words, the shortcoming of 
American legal education is that it promotes a narrow form of theoretical 
353. Granfield, supra n. 65, at 160--61 (Some law students justify their decision to do corporate 
work on the grounds that corporate firms provide the best general training in lawyering skills.). 
354. See Molvig, supra n. 315. at 12 (In this vein, Howard Eisenberg, Dean of Marquette 
University Law School, sees the tension between "the sheet metal workers and the ivory tower 
philosophers" as essential to a good legal education because it promotes continued dialogue on the 
role of both theory and practice in a well-rounded legal education and prevents one camp of thought 
from winning over the other.). 
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learning about law. When theory is aligned to the realities of law and 
legal practice, it becomes a natural complement to practice skills. More 
than this, theory becomes requisite for practice skills and gives meaning 
to the everyday work of lawyers and allows lawyers to realize the 
implications of the tasks that they perform on the job. 
But why uproot a well-established tradition of legal education? How 
much can it hurt to leave Lang dell's legacy in tact? Why allow art, 
international perspectives, lectures, and practice skills to make heretical 
encroachments into the American legal classroom? Because good 
lawyers, and thus good students, must always remember that law doesn't 
begin with a casebook. It doesn't begin with the Socratic method. It 
begins with stronger forces of both great joy and great pain that manifest 
themselves across borders, across time, and in art, music, and literature. 
To recognize these forces is not to succumb to the reification of law but 
to serve as a reminder of law's larger story and of origins which are 
deeper than typically portrayed in American law schools. Law is drawn 
from forces more far reaching than those which can be expressed in the 
confines of Christopher Columbus Langdell's legal classroom, and Jaw 
operates among emotions, powers, and patterns of human life more 
resilient than even Langdell 's legacy oflegal education. 
